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As the movement of money has evolved from the physical
transfer of notes in satchels to transfer by electronic transmission,
economic, governmental, and legal groups interested in the
proceeds of those transfers have sought to adapt to keep pace.'
Emblematic of the modem approach is the experience of the
United States in the effort to stop drug trafficking. As traditional
law enforcement mechanisms failed, the U.S. government turned
to measures designed to assail the proceeds of the drug trafficker.
Beginning in 1986, statutes forbidding money laundering have
transformed traditional banking norms and empowered the
government to closely monitor and control the flow of money.2
Legal systems have also sought to adapt. Troubled by the ease
of transfer of money and egregious situations involving the
plundering of national treasuries, courts modified traditional legal
theory to address the problems created by the explosion of
liquidity.' Courts have taken approaches that have implicated
fundamental concepts regarding the right to property and the
power of the courts to ensure the validity and potency of their
jurisdiction. The struggle between these two imperatives is
perhaps most vividly displayed in the context of the pre-judgment
See ELINOR HARRIS SOLOMON, VIRTUAL MONEY 156-57 (1997).
2 See, e.g., 31 U.S.C. §§ 5311, 5316 (1994) (requiring banks to report transactions
over $10,000 in value); 18 U.S.C. § 5325 (1994) (requiring banks to keep records of all
transactions over $3,000 in value); 18 U.S.C. §§ 1856-57 (prohibiting money laundering
activities).
I See, e.g., litigation surrounding the ill-gotten gains of the Duvaliers, infra notes
42-55 and accompanying text, and the Marcoses, infra notes 329-37 and accompanying
text.
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restraint of assets.4
In Part I, this Comment analyzes the approach adopted by the
English courts since 1975, an example that has not been lost on
U.S. courts.! Part II explores the tools available to U.S. courts in
crafting interlocutory orders designed to preserve a source of
funds for satisfaction of an eventual money judgment.6 Part Ill
offers an appraisal of the state of the law in the United States
circuit courts on this subject.7 Finally, Part IV discusses the U.S.
Supreme Court's 1999 decision resolving, at least for now, the
tension between property rights and pre-judgment restraint of
assets. 8
Part I: The English Example
Ever since a watershed opinion in 1975,9 English courts have
aggressively expanded the applicability of pre-judgment
interlocutory relief in domestic and international contexts.'
0
American legal commentators have generally approved this
development and urged the adoption of similar measures by
American courts." Furthermore, at least one U.S. circuit court has
expressed admiration for the English courts' success in this field. 2
Since 1873, the traditional division between law and equity in
I Restraint of assets often involves extraterritorial effects including forced
repatriation of assets. See, e.g., Derby & Co. v. Weldon (Derby No. 6), [1990] 1 W.L.R.
1139, 1153 (C.A. 1990); In re Estate of Ferdinand Marcos, Human Rights Litigation, 25
F.3d 1467, 1478-80 (9th Cir. 1994).
5 See infra notes 9-136 and accompanying text.
6 See infra notes 137-65 and accompanying text.
I See infra notes 166-488 and accompanying text.
8 See infra notes 489-530 and accompanying text.
9 See Mareva Compania Naviera S.A. v. International Bulkcarriers S.A., [1975] 2
Lloyd's Rep. 509 (C.A. 1975).
10 See infra notes 18-135 and accompanying text.
I See, e.g., George A. Bermann, Provisional Relief in Transnational Litigation, 35
COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 553 (1997); Manuel Juan Dominguez, Using Prejudgment
Attachments in the European Community and the U.S., 5 J. TRANSNAT'L L. & POLICY 41
(1995); David L. Zicherman, Note, The Use of Pre-Judgment Attachments and
Temporary Injunctions in International Commercial Arbitration Proceedings: A
Comparative Analysis of the British and American Approaches, 50 U. PrT. L. REV. 667
(1989).
12 See Alliance Bond Fund, Inc. v. Grupo Mexicano de Desarrollo, S.A., 143 F.3d
688, 696 (2d Cir. 1998), rev'd, 119 S.Ct. 1961 (1999).
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the English courts has been abolished; an English court sitting in
equity may award legal relief and a court of law may issue
injunctions.13 Traditional restraints on judicial power to issue
injunctions remained intact. The change "[did] not confer an
arbitrary or an unregulated discretion" on the courts nor did it
"mean that the Court is to grant an injunction simply because it
thinks it convenient.' 4 Furthermore, it did not modify "[t]he very
first principle of injunction law . . . that prima facie you do not
obtain injunctions to restrain actionable wrongs for which
damages are the proper remedy."' 5  Nevertheless, since the
granting of injunctions operates in personam, and "[t]he person to
whom [the injunction is] addressed must be within the reach of the
Court or amenable to its jurisdiction ... the Court will not suffer
any one within its reach to do what is contrary to its notions of
equity, merely because the act to be done may be, in point of
locality, beyond its jurisdiction."' 6  The only limitation on the
courts' ability to enjoin acts of an in personam defendant beyond
its jurisdiction would be when the injunction "can have no specific
operation without the intervention of a foreign Court, and which in
the country where the lands to be charged by it lie, would probably
be treated as a brutum fulmen. ' '7 Against this historical backdrop,
since 1975, the English courts have expanded and refined the use
of injunctive relief to order the restraint and repatriation of assets
worldwide.
A. The Creation of the Mareva Injunction
The genesis of the doctrine expanding the availability of pre-
judgment restraint appeared in a brief 1975 opinion issued by the
Court of Appeal.' 8  In Mareva Compania Naviera S.A. v.
13 See F.H. LAWSON, REMEDIES of ENGLISH LAW 194 (2d ed. 1980) (citing the
Supreme Court of Judicature Act, 1873, 36 & 37 Vict., ch. 66, § 24 (Eng.)).
14 WILLIAM WILLIAMSON KERR AND JAMES MELVIN PATERSON, KERR ON THE LAW
AND PRACTICE OF INJUNCTIONS 4 (6th ed. 1927 (reprint 1981)) (citations omitted).
1' Id. at 6 (citations omitted).
16 Id. at 11 (citations omitted).
17 KERR, supra note 14, at 11. (Citations omitted.) Brutum fulmen is an empty
threat or judgment void on its face and without legal effect. See BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 194 (6th ed. 1990).
is The English civil court system begins with County and Magistrates' Courts for
cases below a certain damages or complexity threshold. The next level, or High Court, is
422 [Vol. 25
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International Bulkcarriers S.A.,' 9 shipowners sued the charterers of
the vessel upon the latter's repudiation of the charter, claiming
$30,800 in unpaid fees and an unspecified amount in damages.2 °
The defendant charterers had a source of funds on deposit in a
London bank sufficient to pay the unpaid fees but, for reasons they
did not specify, the defendants failed to perform according to the
terms of the charter.2' Fearing the charterers would transfer the
funds on deposit in London before a final judgment, the plaintiffs
sought ex parte injunctive relief to restrain the defendants from
disposing of their assets or otherwise removing them from the
jurisdiction.22 The trial court granted the injunction for a period of
three days23 but refused to extend it past that time, and the
plaintiffs appealed.24 The Court of Appeal heard the case the same
day, before expiration of the injunction.25
In a brief opinion, the length of which belies its profound
subsequent impact, the three-judge panel determined the sought-
for relief was appropriate on the facts of the case, finding authority
for its action in statute, treatise, and case law.26 The Court focused
principally upon Chapter 49, section 45 of the Judicature Act of
divided between the Chancery Division responsible for tax, probate, bankruptcy,
property, and corporate cases, the Family Division responsible for domestic cases, and
the Queen's Bench Division responsible for contract, tort, admiralty, and commercial
cases. The Court of Appeal, Civil Division hears appeals from the High Court. Finally,
the House of Lords may grant leave to hear appeals from the Court of Appeal. See
PENNY DARBYSHIRE, EDDEY ON THE ENGLISH LEGAL SYSTEM 268 (6th ed. 1996).
19 [1975] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 509 (C.A. 1975). A similar restraint order was made
contemporaneously to that in Mareva in Nippon Yusen Kaisha v. Karageorgis, [1975] 1
W.L.R. 1093 (C.A. 1975). See Derby No. 6, [1990] 1 W.L.R. 1139, 1153 (C.A. 1990).
Thus, the choice of Mareva as the label for the doctrine is understandable.
20 See Mareva, [1975] 2 Lloyd's Rep. at 510.
21 See id. at 510. The total amount available to the defendants was £174,000, on
deposit in the Bank of Bilbao's London branch, paid by the Indian High Commission
pursuant to a sub-charter.
22 See id.
23 The plaintiffs issued their writ, i.e., filed their complaint, on June 20, 1975. The
trial court granted an injunction until 5 PM on June 23, 1975. See id. at 509.
24 See id. The trial court refused the extension, relying upon Lister & Co. v.
Stubbs, 45 Ch. D. I (C.A. 1890) (holding that a defendant is not required to give security
before judgment). See id. at 510.
25 See id. at 509.
26 See id.
20001 423
424 N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. [Vol. 25
1925.27 That law provided "The High Court may grant a
mandamus or an injunction or appoint a receiver by an
interlocutory order of the court in all cases in which it shall appear
to the court to be just or convenient. 2 ' Lord Denning proposed a
standard for the grant of an injunction restraining the disposition
of assets: "If it appears that the debt is due and owing--and there is
a danger that the debtor may dispose of his assets so as to defeat it
before judgment-the Court has jurisdiction . . . to prevent [the
debtor from] disposing of those assets."29  Since the Court in
Mareva held that "the shipowners may not get their charter hire at
all," the injunction was proper. ° Lord Justice Roskill agreed on
the basis that the debt was certainly due, the default was "plain
and unexcused," and "the plaintiffs will suffer a grave injustice...
[having to] wait a long time . . . for discharge [of the vessel]
without remuneration while the defendants will be able to
dissipate that £174,000."'" The third member of the panel, Lord
Justice Ormrod, concurred." The court authorized the
continuation of the injunction until trial or further order of the
court.33 Notably, the injunctive relief was limited to "those
27 See id. at 510 (citing Supreme Court of Judicature Act, 1925, 15 & 16 Geo. 5,
ch. 49, § 45 (Eng.)). See also 21 HALSBURY'S LAWS OF ENGLAND § 729 (3d ed. 1957);
Beddow v. Beddow, 9 Ch.D. 89 (1878).
28 Supreme Court of Judicature Act, 1925, 15 & 16 Geo. 5, ch. 49, § 45 (Eng.).
29 Mareva, [1975] 2 Lloyd's Rep. at 510.
30 Id. at 511.
31 Id. In finding the debt was now due, Lord Justice Roskill relied on the ex parte
statements and submissions of the plaintiff that the charter was based on a daily rate of
hire and no payment had been made since the first two half-monthly payments; the third
payment, the only payment past due, had not been made for no apparent good reason;
and, the vessel was currently on a voyage charter, i.e. was sub-chartered, to a third party.
See id. Though Lord Justice Roskill later based his support of the injunction on these
"rather narrow reasons," Id. at 512, the narrowness of application of a rule that grants a
plaintiffs attachment request because the defendant has assets, has defaulted on a
payment, and has effectively sub-leased a chattel is far from clear.
32 See id. at 512.
33 See id. The court's decision to indefinitely continue the injunction after an ex
parte application and without any requirement of a hearing with the presence of the
defendant illustrates a striking difference between English standards of due process and
their American equivalents. Such an approach would be prohibited in America as an
infringement of a defendant's due process rights. See Shawmut Bank v. Costello, 643
A.2d 194 (R.I. 1994) (holding Rhode Island's equity attachment statute that allowed
attachment of property without the opportunity for a hearing or a requirement to show an
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moneys which are now in the bank," namely, the funds paid by the
Indian High Commission to the defendants for the voyage charter,
and did not extend to any other assets of the defendants.34
B. The Development of the Doctrine
Despite Lord Justice Roskill's admonition that "[t]his Court
should not . . . on an ex parte interlocutory application be too
ready to disturb the practice of the past save for good reasons,"35
the request for and use of Mareva injunctions spread rapidly in
English courts.36  The decision of the Mareva court was
subsequently codified by Parliament in the Supreme Court Act of
1981 .3  Nevertheless, its application to a defendant's assets
outside of the United Kingdom was not recognized for some
time.3' As late as 1984, commentators opined that the language of
the Supreme Court Act limited the application of a Mareva
injunction to assets physically within the jurisdiction of the court
of issue.39  That same year, the English Court of Appeals
unfettered the Mareva injunction from its domestic limitations and
expanded its scope to include worldwide application through a
redefinition of the jurisdictional basis of such relief.40
1. Babanaft International Company S.A. v. Bassatne and
Republic of Haiti v. Duvalier
The traditional limits on the Mareva injunction were first
weakened in 1988 when the Court of Appeal granted a post-
exigency violated the U.S. and Rhode Island Constitutions).
14 Mareva, [1975] 2 Lloyd's Rep. at 511.
35 See id.
36 This remedy has proved advantageous to plaintiffs, as shown by the over 1000
applications for Mareva injunctions that were heard by English courts every month by
1984. See David W. Shenton, Attachments and Other Interim Court Remedies in
Support of Arbitration: The English Courts, 1984 INT'L Bus. LAW. 101, 104.
37 Supreme Court Act, 1981, ch. 54, § 37(1), (3) (Eng.).
38 See Derby & Co., Ltd. v. Weldon, 1990 Ch. 48 (C.A. 1988); Republic of Haiti v.
Duvalier, 1990 Q.B. 202 (C.A. 1988); Babanaft Int'l Co. S.A. v. Bassatne, [1989] 1 All
E.R. 433 (C.A. 1988).
39 See, e.g., Shenton, supra note 35, at 104 (limiting application of Mareva
injunctions).
40 See Derby & Co., Ltd. v. Weldon, 1990 Ch. 48 (C.A. 1988); Republic of Haiti v.
Duvalier, 1990 Q.B. 202 (C.A. 1988); Babanaft Int'l Co. S.A. v. Bassatne, [1989] 1 All
E.R. 433 (C.A. 1988).
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judgment Mareva injunction on the worldwide assets of a
defendant, tempered by a proviso intended to minimize the harm
to third parties from such an extraordinary measure.4' This first
crack in the facade of the traditional doctrine limiting Mareva
injunctions to domestic assets was followed by the grant of a pre-
judgment worldwide Mareva injunction in 1988. In Republic of
Haiti v. Duvalier,42 the Haitian government sought the return of
assets looted from the national treasury by its former president and
his family, the Duvaliers.4'3  The main action was pending in
France, but the Haitian government sought a Mareva injunction
restraining the ability of defendants from dealing with assets
worldwide and a corollary disclosure order.44 On June 3, 1988, the
trial court initially ordered that the defendants be:
[R]estrained from dealing with assets which represented the
proceeds of the payments complained of in the French action...
restrained from removing from the jurisdiction or dealing with
their assets within the jurisdiction save in so far as they exceed
[US]$120 [million] in value... [and] to disclose [through their
solicitors] to the plaintiff's solicitors ... the nature, location, and
value of those defendant's assets.45
The defendant's solicitors applied to the trial judge for
discharge of the order and another made subsequently but were
denied. 46  The solicitors' appeal to the Court of Appeal was
41 See Babanaft Int'l Co. S.A. v. Bassatne, [1989] 1 All E.R. 433 (C.A. 1988). The
order would not affect third parties "unless and to the extent that it is enforced by the
courts of the states in which any of the defendant's assets are located." Id. at 447.
42 1990 Q.B. 202 (C.A. 1988).
43 See id.
4 See id. at 206. Mareva injunctions are usually accompanied by a mandatory
disclosure order, referred to as an Anton Piller order after the case in which such orders
were first authorized, Anton Piller KG v. Manufacturing Processes Ltd., [1976] Ch. 55
(C.A. 1976). The Anton Piller order allows opposing parties access to premises and
preserves documents for use in litigation and has a worldwide effect. See George A.
Bermann, Provisional Relief in Transnational Litigation, 35 COLUMBIA J. TRANSNAT'L
L. 553, 580-82 (1997).
45 Duvalier, 1990 Q.B. at 208. Lord Justice Staughton noted, "[n]otice that not
only was the order made in the absence of the defendants and without their knowledge it
was also not to be communicated to them until after their solicitors had complied with
that part relating to disclosure of information. In these respects it was in line with
current English practice." Id. at 208.
46 See id. at 209. The solicitors contended that the French claim was not a tracing,
or equitable, claim; therefore, the English court could not order worldwide disclosure.
426 [Vol. 25
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similarly denied.47  The defendants were finally informed of the
proceedings and on June 22, 1988, applied to the trial court to set
aside the proceedings for want of jurisdiction.48 Upon denial, the
defendants appealed.49
Lord Justice Staughton approved the court's jurisdiction."
Though plaintiffs only applied for interim relief from the court
with no underlying substantive claim, the statute5 allowed such
relief ancillary to an action in another country that was a party to
the Brussels Convention on Jurisdiction and Enforcement of
Judgments. 2 Furthermore, while he disagreed that the action in
France was a tracing or proprietary claim as opposed to a claim for
monetary judgment, Lord Justice Staughton nevertheless felt that
the permissible scope of a Mareva injunction included worldwide





50 See id. at 212.
51 See id. at 210 (citing Civil Jurisdiction and Judgments Act 1982, § 25 (Eng.)).
As presently enacted, Rules of the Supreme Court, Order 11 rule 8A provides:
(1) Service of an originating summons out of the jurisdiction claiming interim
relief under section 25(1) of the Civil Jurisdiction and Judgments Act 1982 (as
extended by Order in Council made under section 25(3)), is permissible with the
leave of the Court.
(2) An application for the grant of leave under paragraph (1) must be supported
by an affidavit stating-
(a) the grounds on which the application is made;
(b) that in the deponent's belief the plaintiff has a good claim to interim relief;
(c) in what place or country the defendant is, or probably may be, found.
Rules of the Supreme Court (Revision), S.I. 1965, No. 1776 (amended by S.I.
1997, No. 415, r 2. See also 37 HALSBURY'S LAWS OF ENGLAND paras.
171-195 (4th ed. 1982).
52 See Convention on Jurisdiction and the Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and
Commercial Matters (Brussels Convention), September 27, 1968, 8 I.L.M. 229.
13 See Duvalier, 1990 Q.B. at 214 (citing Ashtiani v. Kashi, 1987 Q.B. 888 (Eng.
C.A. 1987)).
[T]he powers of the court are wider... if a... claim is what is called a tracing
[i.e. proprietary] claim .... A proprietary claim is one by which the plaintiff
seeks the return of chattels or land which are his property, or claims that a
specified debt is owed by a third party to him and not to the defendant .... A
plaintiff who seeks to enforce a claim of that kind will more readily be afforded
428 N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. [Vol. 25
fact that such had not been heretofore granted was properly
viewed as a "limitation as arising from settled practice, rather than
from any restriction on the powers of the court. 5 4 He cautioned
that granting a pre-judgment worldwide Mareva would be
appropriate only in "rare--if not very rare" cases."
2. Derby & Company, Ltd. v. Weldon (Derby No. 1)
Derby & Co., Ltd. v. Weldon56 arose after CML, a London
commodity dealer which specialized in the international cocoa
trade, found itself holding over £35 million in bad debt from an
insolvent Hong Kong business group, of which only £1,485,148
had been recovered in the insolvency proceedings." Plaintiffs,
members of a U.S. banking group, which owned CML, sued
multiple defendants alleging breach of contract, misrepresentation,
deceit, conspiracy to defraud, and fraudulent breach of fiduciary
duty.58 The plaintiffs claimed damages of £35,580,424 from loans
made by CML's two executive directors, Weldon and Jay, to the
Hong Kong business group in order to allow the Hong Kong group
to repay them for debts owed personally to Weldon and Jay.59
Plaintiffs applied for a worldwide Mareva injunction against
interim remedies in order to preserve the asset which he is seeking to recover,
than one who merely seeks a judgment for debt or damages.
Id. at 213-14.
14 Id. at 215.
55 Id. The Lord Justice did not elaborate on what would constitute a rare case, but
the facts of the instant case and their likely effect on the decision of the Court of Appeal
should be appreciated. The Duvaliers were very unsympathetic defendants who had
engaged in a pattern of conduct intended to secret their assets. See id. at 207.
56 The litigation in this case was very complex. Initiated in June 1987, the case
wound its way back and forth between the Chancery Division and the Civil Court of
Appeal on a variety of issues, though the Mareva injunctions question was the most
problematic in occupying judicial resources. Fourteen decisions at the trial and appellate
levels are available through LEXIS-NEXIS. The three opinions with which this
Comment is concerned are all Court of Appeal decisions. This Comment will refer to
them as Derby No. 1, 1990 Ch. 48 (C.A. 1988); Derby Nos. 3 and 4, 1990 Ch. 65 (C.A.
1988); and, Derby No. 6, [19901 1 W.L.R. 1139 (C.A. 1990).
57 See Derby No. 1, 1990 Ch. at 53.
58 See id. at 50, 53. The defendants consisted of the two executive directors of
CML, Weldon and Jay, and two companies the men controlled, Milco, a Panamanian
company, and CML Holding SA, a Luxembourgeois company. See id. at 50.
59 See id. at 53.
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the first and second defendants, but the trial court refused.6 °
Though the judge found the plaintiffs had satisfied the
requirements for a Mareva injunction, he relied upon precedent
that restricted the use of a Mareva injunction to assets within the
jurisdiction." The Court of Appeal disagreed, relying heavily on
the proceedings of another panel of that court that was
contemporaneously hearing the appeal in Duvalier.
62
Recognizing the use of the Mareva injunction as a developing
area of law, and cognizant of the oppressive nature of the remedy,
the court established three requirements for issue of a worldwide
Mareva injunction: (1) plaintiff has a good, arguable case; (2) a
real risk exists that defendant will dissipate assets; and, (3)
defendant has insufficient English assets to satisfy a potential
61settlement. 6
Defendants in the case argued that no Mareva injunction
should issue absent "evidence of previous malpractice or nefarious
intent" by defendants to avoid the jurisdiction of the court. 64 The
court rejected this contention, emphasizing the early stage of the
litigation.65 The justices seemed to believe that the facts of the
case implied the necessary intent of the defendants such that the
Mareva injunction was warranted, but they made no formal
findings of fact to support that conclusion.66  One justice
concluded, "defendants are clearly sophisticated operators who
have amply demonstrated their ability to render assets untraceable
and a determination not to reveal them," without citing any facts
upon which he relied in coming to that conclusion.67 Another cited
the trial judge's decision that in the absence of specific evidence
of deceit, the honesty of the two individual defendants must be
assumed. 68 Lord Justice Nicholls rejected the pertinence of the
60 See id. at 54.
61 See id. (citing Ashtiani v. Kashi, 1987 Q.B. 888 (C.A. 1987)).
62 See id. Lord Justice May acknowledged that "we are hearing this appeal almost
simultaneously with the delivery of the judgment in the Duvalier case." See id
63 See id. at 57.
64 Id. at 55.
65 See id.
66 See id.
67 Id. at 57.
68 See id. at 61.
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inquiry: "[I]f by what he said the judge meant that a restraint order
in respect of overseas assets should not be made in the absence of
proof of dishonesty on the part of the defendants even though the
action is only at a very interlocutory stage, then I should feel
bound to part company from him."69
The proceeding at the trial court occupied five weeks, a fact
much lamented by the Court of Appeal. ° Evidently, the issue that
commanded such attention was whether plaintiffs had a
proprietary claim for an accounting of profits, as they contended,
or whether their claim was simply for money judgment, as
defendants argued.7" In the Court of Appeal's view, issues crucial
to a determination of appropriate remedies in a U.S. case, such as
the nature of the claim of relief, required adjudication of "point[s]
of law" and "fine questions of fact" inappropriate for a pre-trial
hearing.72
The court concluded that a worldwide Mareva injunction was
appropriate in this and similar cases, provided it was accompanied
by certain safeguards necessary to protect defendants from a
multiplicity of proceedings or a misuse of information gathered
pursuant to an ancillary disclosure order and to protect third
parties.73 The court modified the proviso adopted in the Babanaft
case to accomplish these goals.74
3. Derby & Company, Ltd. v. Weldon (Derby Nos. 3 and 4)
As the Derby litigation continued, more questions were raised
concerning the permissible parameters of the Mareva injunction.
While Derby No. 1 established the propriety of a worldwide
Mareva injunction, the defendants in that proceeding had assets in
England that were unquestionably subject to the jurisdiction of the
court.75 The question there had been whether foreign assets could
69 Id.
70 See id. at 64.
71 See id. at 63.
72 Id.
73 See id. at 58-61.
71 See id. at 59-60. The court modified the proviso to require the plaintiffs to seek
leave of the English court before making any application to a foreign jurisdiction. See
id. at 59.
71 See supra notes 55-73 and accompanying text.
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be restrained by the English court, not whether the court had
power over the defendants.76 When the plaintiffs applied for a
worldwide Mareva injunction against and appointment of a
receiver for the third and fourth defendants, a Panamanian
company and a Luxembourgian holding company, the trial court
was faced with a request for a worldwide restraint on the assets of
defendants who were neither resident in the jurisdiction nor had
assets present in the jurisdiction.77 If granted, the injunction would
exemplify an extraordinary exercise of power. Nevertheless, the
trial court granted the plaintiff's request as to the Luxembourgian
company, 78 relying on the enforceability of the judgment under the• 71
European Judgments Convention. Since Panama was not a
signatory to that or a similar convention, the trial court refused to
grant the relief as to the Panamanian company on the grounds that
"nothing brings the law into greater disrepute than the making of
orders which cannot be enforced."8°
Defendants argued that the decisions in Babanaft, Duvalier,
and Derby No. 18 all made within the preceding year, were an
"impermissible extension of the Mareva jurisdiction and of the
recognized practice, which had become established over the past
13 years."8  Accordingly, the trial judge should not have granted
the application for a Mareva injunction and a receiver against the
Luxembourgeois company.83  Plaintiffs cross-appealed the
decision to refuse the relief sought against the Panamanian
84
company.
The court evidently appreciated the force of the defendants'
argument as it felt compelled to reject it at length. While the
court recognized that the Mareva injunction was a radical
76 See Derby No. 1, 1990 Ch. 48 (C.A. 1988).
7 See Derby & Co. Ltd. v. Weldon (Derby Nos. 3 and 4), [1990] Ch. 65 (C.A.
1988).
78 See id. at 75.
79 See Brussels Convention, supra note 52.
80 Derby Nos. 3 and 4, 1990 Ch. at 80.
81 See supra notes 40-74 and accompanying text.
82 Derby Nos. 3 and 4, 1990 Ch. at 90.
83 See id. at 75.
84 See id.
85 See id. at 87-94.
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departure from the long-established jurisprudence, 6 it asserted the
propriety of such relief for several reasons. First, the court
discovered a statutory basis for the principles espoused by Mareva
in addition to the admittedly amorphous authority in the Supreme
Court of Judicature Act of 1925 and its progeny." The
Matrimonial Causes Act of 1973, predating the Mareva decision
by two years, allowed a court to grant interlocutory orders at its
discretion upon application of a party if the "other party ...is,
with the intention of defeating the claim for financial relief, about
to make any disposition or to transfer out of the jurisdiction or
otherwise deal with any property."88 In a 1985 case, the Court of
Appeal had employed the Act to restrain a defendant from
disposing of real property in Spain.89
Second, the court relied on standard statutory construction:
[W]here Parliament has invested the court with a discretion
which has to be exercised in an almost inexhaustible variety of
delicate and difficult circumstances, and ...has not . ..
define[d] or specif[ied] any cases or classes of cases for its
application, this court ought not to limit or restrict that discretion
by laying down rules within which alone the discretion is to be
exercised. 90
Therefore, though the Mareva injunction had been initially
confined to cases in which the defendant was not resident in the
jurisdiction but had property in the jurisdiction, and the injunction
only restrained removal of property from the jurisdiction, these
limitations had been systematically relaxed by subsequent cases.91
In short, the doctrine was adapting and developing quickly as
"[t]he transfer of funds from one jurisdiction to another [grew]
ever more speedy and the methods of transfer more
sophisticated. '" 92 Therefore, to state that the doctrine had "already
86 See id. at 88.
87 See id. at 76. Lord Donaldson placed the 1925 Act as the successor to the
Supreme Court of Judicature Act, 1873, 36 & 37 Vict., ch. 66, § 24 (Eng.). See id; see
supra notes 27-28 and accompanying text for discussion of the 1925 Act.
8 Id. at 89 (quoting the Matrimonial Causes Act, 1973, § 37(2) (Eng.)).
89 See Hamlin v. Hamlin, [19851 3 W.L.R. 629 (1985).
90 Derby Nos. 3 & 4, 1990 Ch. 65, 92 (C.A. 1988) (quoting Blunt v. Blunt, 1943
App. Cas. 517 (H.L. 1943)).
9' See id. at 89-90.
92 Id. at 92.
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become ossified" would be premature.93
Third, the nature of the Mareva is not in rem; rather, it is in
personam. 94  "[A] Mareva injunction does not have any in rem
effect on the assets themselves or the defendant's title to them."95
As a result, the court felt,
the time has come to state unequivocally that in an appropriate
case the court has power to grant an interlocutory injunction
even on a worldwide basis against any person who is properly
before the court, so as to prevent that person by the transfer of
his property frustrating a future judgment of the court.96
The court did not resolve the difference between a claim in
equity vice law; indeed, it appears the court rejected any
difference between the two in the Mareva context.97  While
classifying the Mareva injunction as an equitable remedy, 98 the
court approved the grant of the injunction in Duvalier where the
Court of Appeal viewed the claim as one for money judgment.99
Upon that legal basis, the court had no difficulty rejecting the
defendants' appeal and granting the plaintiffs' cross-appeal. The
defendants had undermined their case through some startling
stipulations into which they had entered for purposes of this
appeal.' °° In effect, the stipulations proved every element of Lord
Denning's criteria: the defendants were controlled by the
93 Id.
94 See id. at 96. American jurisprudence would not classify the nature of the
Mareva in Derby Nos. 3 and 4 as either in personam or in rem. In personam jurisdiction
is defined as "[p]ower which a court has over the person himself in contrast to the court's
power over the defendant's interest in property (quasi in rem) or power over the property
itself (in rem)." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 791 (6th ed. 1990). Likewise, a Mareva
affecting assets within the jurisdiction as in the Mareva case itself is more appropriately
viewed as quasi in rem. Since Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186 (1977), quasi in rem
jurisdiction requires the same minimum contacts analysis as in personam jurisdiction for
a non-resident defendant. See Bermann, supra note 43, at 560-62.
95 Derby Nos. 3 & 4, 1990 Ch. at 83.
96 Id. at 93. The court approved the language used by Lord Denning in Mareva for
determining the appropriateness of the relief. See id. at 92 (quoting Mareva Compania
Naviera S.A. v. International Bulkcarriers S.A., [1975] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 509, 510 (C.A.
1975)).
97 See id. at 93 (quoting 21 HALSBURY's LAWS OF ENGLAND § 729 (3d ed. 1957)).
98 See id. at 96.
99 See supra note 52 and accompanying text.
1o Derby Nos. 3 & 4, 1990 Ch. at 76.
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individual defendants, Weldon and Jay; the defendant companies
"might be likely to dissipate their assets;" and the plaintiffs might
recover as much as £25 million at trial.' On these facts, and with
the wide discretion with which they found themselves to be armed,
the court found the Mareva injunction and appointment of a
receiver appropriate for both defendants.' 2  The problem of
enforceability vis A vis the Panamanian company was resolved on
the basis that the court assumed the company would obey the
court's orders; if it did not, it would be barred from defending the
suit.'0 3 A receiver was appropriate for similar reasons, since the
assets of the Panamanian company might well be located in a
country signatory to the Brussels Convention.' °4  Finally, to
minimize the adverse consequences to third parties of the court's
in personam injunction affecting the defendants' property
overseas, the court tinkered with the Babanaft proviso issued by
the trial court.' 5
4. Derby & Company, Ltd. v. Weldon (Derby No. 6)
Though not the last opinion in the dispute between Derby &
Co. and Weldon, Derby No. 6 is the last that addressed the issues
of the scope and propriety of the Mareva injunction in
international litigation.' 6 By the time of Derby No. 6, the number
of defendants had risen to eleven.'0 7 Numbers five through eleven
were a menagerie of Swiss lawyers, Liechtensteiner trustees, and
Panamanian shell trust companies that held assets under the
direction of the former two groups.' 8 At this point in the case, the
receiver appointed by the court in prior orders held certain assets
101 Id.
02 See id. at 98.
103 See id. at 81.
104 See id. at 86.
105 See id. at 87. The order would not affect third parties unless it was recognized
by the jurisdiction in which the assets were located, or the third party was subject to in
personam jurisdiction of the English courts and had been notified of the order and could
assist in its execution. See id. Considering the liberality of English worldwide service of
process and jurisdictional rules, the protection offered third parties by this modification
is problematic. See infra notes 112-13, 131-32 and accompanying text.
106 Derby No. 6, [1990] 1 W.L.R. 1139 (C.A. 1990).
107 Seeid. at 1145.
108 See id.
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on deposit in Switzerland and elsewhere jointly with a Swiss
lawyer and a Liechtensteiner trustee. 09 The deposits held outside
Switzerland were held jointly in the names of the various trustees
or trust companies and the receiver."' Plaintiffs sought an order
requiring all assets held by all the defendants to be held solely in
the name of the receiver, any assets in Switzerland to be
transferred out of that country, and any assets held elsewhere not
to be returned to Switzerland upon maturity."' Defendants sought
repatriation to Switzerland on the basis that such a transfer would
more accurately reflect the status quo of the assets at the onset of
litigation. 12
Several wrinkles complicated matters. First, Swiss criminal
law prohibited the receiver, an accountant in Zurich, from
exercising any authority granted him by the English court."'3
Nevertheless, the receiver would not be subject to criminal
liability for actions related to assets held outside of Switzerland or
for the transfer of assets outside of Switzerland provided the assets
remained jointly controlled by the receiver and the Swiss lawyer
or Liechtensteiner trustee."14 Second, the fifth to eleventh
defendants were served with process outside of England pursuant
to Rules of the Supreme Court Order 1 ."5 These defendants
protested the jurisdiction of the English court, since any judgment
rendered in that forum would likely not be enforced by the Swiss
courts." 
16
The court reiterated the development of the Mareva doctrine
since 1975, especially in light of prior decisions in Derby itself.
Simply stated,
[t]he jurisdiction of the court to grant a Mareva injunction
109 See id. at 1145-46.
110 See id.
"I See id. at 1141-42.
112 See id. at 1142.
113 Seeid. at 1147.
114 See id.
"I See id. Under Order 11, Rule 5 is entitled "Service of writ or notice of writ
abroad: general." Rule 6 is entitled "Service of writ abroad through foreign
governments, judicial authorities and British consuls." Rules of the Supreme Court, S.I.
1965, No. 1776.
116 See id. Switzerland is not a party to the Brussels Convention. See Brussels
Convention, supra note 51.
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against a person depends not on territorial jurisdiction of the
English court over assets within its jurisdiction, but on the
unlimited jurisdiction of the English court in personam against
any person, whether an individual or a corporation, who is,
under English procedure, properly made a party to proceedings
pending before the English court.117
According to the court, it undoubtedly had the power to make
an order requiring the transfer of assets from one jurisdiction to
another. "8 The court viewed such an approach as consonant with
English law regarding the appointment of receivers by English
courts for the foreign assets of English companies as well as the
English courts' de facto recognition of a foreign court to make
orders in personam against those subject to its jurisdiction. '
Acknowledging that the plaintiffs might be inconvenienced by
the need to relitigate the case in Switzerland before they might be
able to reach those assets, Lord Justice Staughton 120 did not believe
that exigency mandated ordering the assets transferred.121 In his
opinion, Lord Staughton lamented the development of the Mareva
injunction coincident with his endorsement of it.1 22  Seeing the
development as a series of steps, from Mareva itself through
Babanaft, Duvalier, and prior decisions in Derby, he pointed to the
consequences of that evolution: increased demand on judicial
resources, increased restraints on defendants before any
determination of liability, and increased interference with
transactions and property overseas. 23 Furthermore, routine use of
foreign service of process coupled with orders for repatriation or
transfer of assets to England "would in [Lord Justice Staughton' s]
17 Id. at 1149. England has no constitutional due process clause to limit
jurisdiction conferred by procedural service of process rules. See William Tetley, Q.C.,
Arrest, Attachment, and Related Maritime Law Procedures, 73 TUL. L. REv. 1895, 1916
(1999) ("There is no general requirement in the United Kingdom for a post-seizure
hearing following the arrest [of a vessel], as there now is in the United States because of
the U.S. Constitutional principle of "due process.").
118 Seeid. at 1153.
19 See id. at 1150. An English court would not exercise its powers in support of a
foreign receiver absent a treaty obligation. See id.
2I Lord Staughton sat on the panel that decided Duvalier. See supra note 52 and
accompanying text.
121 See Derby No. 6, [1990] 1 W.L.R. at 1155.
122 See id. at 1153.
123 See id.
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view justifiably be regarded as unacceptable chauvinism by the
international community.' ' 124  Only in cases where "the actual
proceed of fraud are on board a ship on the high seas flying no
national flag and subject to no country's local jurisdiction ... [o]r
in a country which has no effective system of law, or one which
can only be regarded as uncivilised" should the court's discretion
to order the transfer of assets be exercised. 125 Lord Staughton
concluded that "the Swiss rule as to the enforcement of foreign
judgments, although different from our own rule, is one which can
reasonably be adopted by a civilised system of law. 126
Faced with the likely intransigence of the defendants to
placing assets in Switzerland in the sole control of the receiver, the
reluctance of the Swiss courts to order the same, and the risk of
criminal penalty for the receiver in the undertaking, the court
determined that, in its discretion and under the circumstances, the
Swiss assets would remain in their present location and state of
ownership.'2 7  Assets outside of Switzerland would likewise
remain in place, but ownership thereof would be in the name of
the receiver alone.
28
C. The Current State of English Law
As it stands, English courts are ready and willing to issue
Mareva injunctions. Provided the plaintiff can show a good,
arguable case and a risk that the defendant will dispose of assets in
an effort to defeat an eventual judgment, the Mareva injunction
will issue.22 No proof of nefarious intent on the part of the
defendant is necessary, and the Mareva injunction will invariably
be issued ex parte in the interest of expediency. 3 ° Despite the
admonitions of the courts that a Mareva injunction is an
extraordinary remedy, practice belies the rarity of such relief. 3'
124 id.
125 Id. at 1154.
126 Id. at 1156.
127 See id. at 1152, 1155-56.
128 See id. at 1152, 1155.
129 See supra note 29 and accompanying text.
130 See supra notes 64-65 and accompanying text.
131 A LEXIS-NEXIS search of "Mareva injunction" for cases since 1988 in the
"Reported and Unreported Cases--England and Wales" database resulted in 568
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Furthermore, since Duvalier and Derby, worldwide Mareva
injunctions are available on much the same terms. '32 The only
restraint on the courts' ability to indulge a plaintiff is the
requirement that it have personal jurisdiction over the defendant.33
With the provisions of the Rules of the Supreme Court allowing
worldwide service of process, 3 4 the courts' have a large personal
jurisdiction net. Additionally, since Derby Nos. 3 and 4 approved
the use of a Mareva injunction over a defendant without assets in
the jurisdiction,'35 the law permits worldwide service of process on
a defendant followed by a Mareva injunction and ancillary
discovery orders on the defendant's assets irrespective of
jurisdiction. This was exactly the result in Derby No. 6 for the
Swiss and Liechtensteiner defendants.
136
Part I: Legal Bases of the Pre-Judgment Restraint of
Assets 137 in U.S. Courts
Courts in the United States may rely upon four separate bases
of interlocutory relief when restraining a defendant's assets before
entering a final judgment. The four bases are the All Writs Act, 138
authorization within a specific statute, 3 9 Rule 64 of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, 140 and the inherent equitable power of the
courts. 141 While the methods overlap to some extent, courts have
traditionally respected a division between them. 4 The recent
approaches of the Circuit Courts to the use of interlocutory relief
to secure a fund for satisfaction of a potential money judgment is
decisions.
132 See, e.g., Petrotrade, Inc. v. Smith, [1998] 2 All E.R. 346 (Q.B. 1997).
3 See id.
134 Rules of the Supreme Court, S.I. 1965, No. 1776, Order 11 rules 5 and 6.
135 See supra notes 75-105 and accompanying text.
136 See Derby No. 6, [1990] 1 W.L.R. 1139, 1145 (C.A. 1990).
117 For purposes of this Comment, pre-judgment restraint includes attachment
orders, temporary and preliminary injunctions, and temporary restraining orders.
138 28 U.S.C. § 1651 (1994).
131 See, e.g., Sherman Anti-Trust Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1994).
140 FED. R. Civ. P. 64.
141 See 1 IA CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER, AND MARY KAY KANE,
FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2947 (2d ed. 1995).
142 See id. at §§ 2941-42, 45.
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discussed at length in Part III of this Comment. 43
A. The All Writs Act
Section 1651 of Title 28 states: "[t]he Supreme Court and all
courts established by Act of Congress may issue all writs
necessary or appropriate in aid of their respective jurisdictions and
agreeable to the usages and principles of law."'' 44 The "usages and
principles of law" clause limits the statutory obligation of courts to
issue writs. 145  The statute originally provided a more detailed
description of the powers of the court, but was modified in 1948
after the enactment of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 146 and
in accordance with the Supreme Court's construction of the
statute. 47 Nevertheless, many circuits have concluded that the All
Writs Act gives courts the power to issue pre-judgment orders of
restraint. 48  On the other hand, some circuits have narrowly
construed the Act to apply only to writs in aid of jurisdiction.'
49
Regardless of the approach taken, the Federal Rules provide the
procedural system to regulate how that power may be exercised.
B. Authorization within a Specific Statute
Federal law often provides authority for courts to issue pre-
judgment orders restraining actions by a defendant in violation of
federal law.'50 In most cases, the statutory authorization limits the
143 See infra notes 166-488 and accompanying text.
144 28 U.S.C. § 1651 (1994).
145 Id.
146 For example, references to writs of scirefacias were deleted. See id.
141 "The revised section is expressive of the construction recently placed upon such
section by the Supreme Court in U.S. Alkali Export Assn. v. U.S., 325 U.S. 196 [1945],
and De Beers Consol. Mines v. U.S., 325 U.S. 212 [1945]." Id. See also, infra notes
169-186 and accompanying text.
148 See, e.g., Hoxworth v. Blinder, Robinson & Co., Inc., 903 F.2d 186 (3d Cir.
1990).
149 See, e.g., Mitsubishi Int'l Corp. v. Cardinal Textile Sales, Inc., 14 F.3d 1507,
1517 n.17 (11 th Cir. 1994) (stating, "Conduct not shown to be detrimental to the court's
jurisdiction or exercise thereof cannot be enjoined under the Act."); ITT Community
Dev. Corp. v. Barton, 569 F.2d 1351, 1359-60 (5th Cir. 1978).
150 See, e.g., Sherman Anti-Trust Act, 15 U.S.C. § 4 (1994). The text of that section
states:
The several district courts of the United States are invested with jurisdiction to
prevent and restrain violations of sections 1 to 7 of this title; and it shall be the
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power of the court to the restraint of actions by a defendant, rather
than any restraint of a defendant's assets to preserve a source of
funds to satisfy any final judgment. 5' This narrow scope limits the
usefulness of such authority to a plaintiff. Instead, a plaintiff must
rely on the All Writs Act 52 as the source for the courts' power of
injunctive relief to preserve a source of funds pending a final
judgment. '53
C. Rule 64
On its face, Rule 64 appears to squarely address and set the
limits of any interlocutory relief for the purpose of preserving a
source of funds in contemplation of satisfaction of a money
judgment. It states:
At the commencement of and during the course of an action, all
remedies providing for seizure of person or property for the
purpose of securing satisfaction of the judgment ultimately to be
entered in the action are available under the circumstances and
in the manner provided by the law of the state in which the
district court is held, existing at the time the remedy is sought,
subject to the following qualifications: (1) any existing statute of
the United States governs to the extent to which it is applicable;
(2) the action in which any of the foregoing remedies is used
shall be commenced and prosecuted or, if removed from a state
court, shall be prosecuted after removal, pursuant to these rules.
The remedies thus available include arrest, attachment,
garnishment, replevin, sequestration, and other corresponding or
equivalent remedies, however designated and regardless of
whether by state procedure the remedy is ancillary to an action
or must be obtained by an independent action.'54
The effect given to state law in furnishing the requirements for
relief under the rule "quite commonly . . .permits the use of
duty of ... United States attorneys . . .to institute proceedings in equity to
prevent and restrain such violations . . .pending [notice and a hearing for a
preliminary injunction], the court may at any time make such temporary
restraining order or prohibition as shall be deemed just in the premises.
Id. (emphasis supplied). The section refers to Rule 65, rather than or in addition to Rule
64, since it contemplates suits in equity only. See id.
15, See id.
52 See supra notes 144-49 and accompanying text.
5 Rule 65 recognizes a statute may authorize interlocutory relief. See FED. R. Civ.
P. 65. See also, 1 IA WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 141, at § 2933.
'54 FED. R. Civ. P. 64.
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provisional remedies only in actions of the kind that historically
were at law rather than in equity. This limitation, like other state
provisions about the circumstances and manner in which
provisional remedies can be used, must be honored.'" 5 The extent
to which that admonition is respected is discussed later in this
Comment. 1
56
D. The Inherent Equitable Power of the Courts Administered
through Rule 65
Rule 65 does not authorize the granting of injunctive relief;
rather, it establishes procedural rules for use by the court in ruling
on such a motion."' The grant or denial of such relief is at the
discretion of the trial court, "exercised in conformity with historic
federal equity practice."'58  Accordingly, "the substantive
prerequisites for obtaining an equitable as well as the general
availability of injunctive relief are not altered by the rule and
depend on traditional principles of equity jurisdiction."' In
general, a party seeking a preliminary injunction 160 Must show that
no adequate legal remedy exists and the plaintiff will suffer
irreparable harm if the injunction is not granted.' 61  In what
amounts to a balancing test, the court weighs this harm with
several other factors: plaintiffs likelihood of succeeding on the
merits; whether the potential harm to plaintiff from denial of the
request for an injunction will be greater than the harm to the
defendant from the granting thereof; whether the injunction will
not harm the public interest; and, whether the injunction serves to
maintain the status quo pending the final judgment. 61
A court will also consider the extraterritorial effect of the
155 1 IA WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 141, § 2932.
156 See infra notes 234-488 and accompanying text.
157 See I IA WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 141, § 2941.
158 Id. § 2947. Since the merger of law and equity, injunctive relief is also available
in claims at law, albeit in accordance with equitable principles. See id. § 2941.
159 Id.
160 See supra note 137.
161 See I IA WRIGHT ETAL., supra note 141, § 2941.
162 See id. § 2948; Roland Mach. Co. v. Dresser Indus., Inc., 749 F.2d 380, 382-83
(7th Cir. 1984).
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injunction.' The traditional reluctance of courts to issue
injunctions affecting land situated in another jurisdiction has not
been extended to personalty since the situs court has less of an
interest in the latter than the former. 64 Similarly, negative
injunctions, that is, those that forbid rather than direct an act, are
viewed more favorably as being less intrusive on the sovereignty
of the other jurisdiction. 65
Part III: The Approach Taken by American Courts
A. Foundational Supreme Court Decisions
As discussed in Part II, American law has maintained the
distinction between injunctive relief and attachment depending on
the type of claim presented and the relief requested.' 66  The
seminal case for this subject is the 1945 Supreme Court decision
in De Beers Consolidated Mines v. United States.'67  Of only
slightly less importance are two other Supreme Court cases: The
1940 decision, cited in De Beers, of Deckert v. Independence
.• 168
Shares Corporation, and the 1965 decision United States v. First
National City Bank. 69  Regardless of how a lower court
approached the problem, De Beers, Deckert, and First National
had to be considered either as support for or distinguishable from
the facts of the case at issue. In all of the cases discussed herein in
which the grant or denial of pre-judgment restraint was at issue,
the specific facts were crucial to the court's balance of the relevant
factors and the subsequent outcome.
1. De Beers Consolidated Mines v. United States
In De Beers, the United States brought suit against multiple
corporations and their shareholders engaged in the business of
163 See 1 IA WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 141, § 2945.
164 See id.
165 See id. An example of a negative injunction is an asset freeze order restraining a
defendant from disposing of assets. By contrast, a repatriation order is an example of a
positive injunction. See id.
166 See supra notes 157-65 and accompanying text.
167 325 U.S. 212 (1945).
168 311 U.S. 282 (1940).
169 379 U.S. 378 (1965).
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producing gem and industrial diamonds and exporting them to the
United States. "' The Government alleged violations of the
Sherman Anti-Trust Act' 7' and the Wilson Tariff Act,' claiming
that the defendants had conspired "to restrain and monopolize the
commerce of the United States with foreign nations."'73 The suit
was in equity, as the Government sought to prevent future
monopolizing conduct by the defendants. 174  The Government
obtained a preliminary injunction from the trial court freezing the
defendants' property and bank accounts in the United States. 
17
After a hearing, the trial court held that the injunction was
appropriate under the Sherman Act and the All Writs Act,
whereupon the defendants appealed.'
76
The Government had initially contended that the injunction
was valid as a sequestration of assets under Rule 70,'17 but it
abandoned that argument as untenable since Rule 70 only applies
to compel satisfaction of a judgment.' 78  The Government further
acknowledged that Rule 64 afforded no relief because the
applicable law of the case permitted attachment of defendants'
assets only in a suit seeking monetary damages. 
17
The Court analyzed the nature of the injunction, noting that
"the name given to the process is not determinative,"'80 and
concluded that the trial court's decision implied a list of factors.
170 See De Beers, 325 U.S. at 214-15. Two cases were consolidated on certiorari.
The first, No. 1189, named De Beers and two other South African corporations as
defendants; the second, No. 1190, named as the lead defendant the Societe Internationale
Forestiere et Miniere du Congo and also joined five other corporations and seven
individuals as defendants. See id.
171 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1994).
172 15 U.S.C. §§ 8-11 (1994).
17' De Beers, 325 U.S. at 215.
74 See id. at 219-20.
'15 See id. at 215-16.
176 See id. at 216.
177 Rule 70 provides in part, "If a judgment directs a party ... to perform [a]
specific act and the party fails to comply ... [o]n application of the [other] party, the
clerk shall issue a writ of attachment or sequestration against the property of the
disobedient party." FED. R. Civ. P. 70.
178 See De Beers, 325 U.S. at 218.
171 See id. N.Y. law was the law of the case. See id.
's0 Id. at 219.
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These included jurisdiction over the defendants, a valid cause of
action, possible success for plaintiff on the merits, the chance the
defendants might not comply with the final judgment, subsequent
proceedings for contempt and a resulting fine, refusal by the
defendants to pay the fine, and a dearth of any funds to execute
upon unless funds are frozen in anticipation of that event.'8'
Consequently, the Court classified the injunction "as a method of
providing security for compliance with other process which
conceivably may be issued for satisfaction of a money judgment
for contempt" and therefore not "intermediate relief of the same
character as that which may be granted finally."'82 It distinguished
cases "in which an interlocutory injunction was granted with
respect to a fund or property which would have been the subject of
the provisions of any final decree in the cause."' 83  The Court
rejected the Government's attempt to analogize an injunction
seeking to restrain a corporate defendant from removing property
with a writ ne exeat'84 issued against an individual defendant,
holding that such a writ would be equally inappropriate in a suit in
which the individual defendant owed no debt nor was under any
duty to account to plaintiff for moneys received.' In a quotation
that has become de rigueur on this subject, the Court emphasized
its displeasure with the injunction granted in the principal case.
To sustain the challenged order would create a precedent of
sweeping effect. This suit, as we have said, is not to be
distinguished from any other suit in equity. What applies to it
applies to all such. Every suitor who resorts to chancery for any
sort of relief by injunction may, on a mere statement of belief
that the defendant can easily make away with or transport his
money or goods, impose an injunction on him, indefinite in
duration, disabling him to use so much of his funds or property
as the court deems necessary for security or compliance with its
possible decree. And, if so, it is difficult to see why a plaintiff
in any action for personal judgment in tort or contract may not,
also, apply to the chancellor for a so-called injunction
18 See id.
182 Id. at 220.
183 Id. (citing Deckert v. Independence Shares Corp., 311 U.S. 282 (1942)).
184 A writ ne exeat is designed "to prevent the frustration of a plaintiffs equitable
claims by ensuring the continued physical presence of the defendant within the court's
jurisdiction." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1031 (6th ed. 1990).
185 See De Beers, 325 U.S. at 221-22.
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sequestrating his opponent's assets pending recovery and
satisfaction of a judgment in such a law action. No relief of this
character has been thought justified in the long history of equity
jurisprudence."'
The Court reversed the grant of the injunction."8 7
2. Deckert v. Independence Shares Corporation
Cited in De Beers,"' Deckert v. Independence Shares
Corporation"8 9 involved a suit in equity under the Securities Act of
193319' "to rescind a fraudulent sale . . secure restitution of the
consideration paid ... [and] enforce the right to restitution against
a third party" because of the defendant's insolvency. '9' The trial
court granted an injunction restraining the third party from
disposing of securities issued by the principal defendant. 192 Upon
appeal, the Third Circuit reversed the grant of the injunction. 93
In a short unanimous opinion, the Court agreed that the
Securities Act allowed suits for other than money damages, and
stressed that "the bill states a cause for equitable relief .... The
principle objects of the suit are rescission ... and restitution .....
[Both] may be maintained in equity, at least where there are
circumstances making the legal remedy inadequate.,
194
Allegations that the defendant "was insolvent and its assets in
danger of dissipation or depletion . . . [indicated that] the legal
remedy ... would be inadequate."'95 Since the complaint alleged
186 Id. at 222-23.
187 See id. at 223. Four Justices dissented on the grounds that the Court did not have
the power to hear an appeal from an interlocutory order in an anti-trust case. See id.
(Douglas, J., dissenting) (citing United States v. California Cooperative Canneries, 279
U.S. 553 (1929)). The facts of the principal case where not so extraordinary as to allow
review under the All Writs Act since there was no hardship imposed on the defendants
beyond the inconvenience of posting a bond. See id. at 224-25 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
188 See supra note 183 and accompanying text.
189 311 U.S. 282 (1940).
190 15 U.S.C. § 77 (1994).
191 Deckert, 311 U.S. at 284.
192 See id. at 285-86.
193 See id. at 286. The Third Circuit had also ordered plaintiffs to amend their
complaint to state a cause of action at law. See id.
194 Id. at 288-89.
195 id. at 290.
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circumstances that would, if proven, entitle plaintiffs to equitable
relief, and in view of the narrowness of the injunction'96 and the
requirement of security for any losses suffered by the defendant,
the Court viewed the injunction as "a reasonable measure to
preserve the status quo pending final determination."'97
3. United States v. First National City Bank
In a fascinating case that implicates the role of banking
institutions in disputes between depositors and creditors, the
enforceability of the orders of U.S. courts in other countries, and
the equitable or legal foundation required for pre-judgment
restraint of assets, the Court split in a 7-2 vote with a vigorous
dissent by Justice Harlan.'98 The U.S. Internal Revenue Service
obtained an injunction that froze the assets of an Uruguayan
corporation, Omar, on deposit with the Montevideo branch of First
National City Bank (Citibank).' 99 To complicate the procedural
matters, Omar had never been served with process and was not,
therefore, a party to the suit.
200
Justice Douglas, in a short opinion for the Court, held that the
National Bank Act 20 1 gave the trial court power to issue injunctions
pursuant to enforcement of tax laws. Despite the lack of service
of process on Omar, Justice Douglas held that Omar would be
subject to the jurisdiction of the Federal court in New York under
New York law.203 The lack of service on Omar was not fatal to the
issue of the injunction since the court's order was directed at
Citibank over whom jurisdiction was unchallenged. 20 4 He likewise
196 Though termed narrow by the Court, the amount restrained consisted of
$38,258.85 while the amount in controversy was less than $3,000. See id. at 286.
197 Id. at 289-90.
198 See United States v. First National City Bank, 379 U.S. 378 (1965).
199 See id. at 379-80. Omar had been assessed with a $19 million deficiency and
had been issued with notices of levy and imposition of a federal tax lien against its
assets. See id. at 379.
200 See id. The IRS had begun to investigate Omar in 1959 and filed the complaint
in the suit in October, 1962. In November, 1964, the IRS had yet to obtain service on
Omar. See id. at 385-86 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
201 26 U.S.C. § 7402(a) (1994).
202 See id. at 380.
203 See id. at 381 (citing N.Y. C.P.L.R. 7B (McKinney 1990)).
204 See id. at 383 n.5.
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gave short shrift to the contention that the Montevideo branch of
Citibank was a separate entity and therefore not subject to the
jurisdiction of the district court.2 °5 In light of the significant public
interest involved, 06 Justice Douglas approved of the injunction as
"eminently appropriate to prevent further dissipation of assets., 207
Affidavits filed by the IRS claimed dissipation, but the only
apparent basis in the opinion for claiming an effort to dissipate
assets was Omar's removal of the funds from the United States to
Uruguay.20 ' Nevertheless, Justice Douglas distinguished these
facts from De Beers on the grounds that the assets restrained
"would be 'the subject of the provisions of any final decree in the
cause"' 209 and relied on Deckert for the conclusion that the
210injunction was necessary to preserve the status quo.
In a dissenting opinion four times the length of Justice
Douglas's opinion for the Court, Justice Harlan fervently decried
the Court's ruling.21' After criticizing the Government's failure to
serve Omar, he cautioned against the breadth of the exercise of
power the Court had sanctioned. He noted that although
jurisdiction over Citibank empowered the district court to enter the
injunction, "jurisdiction is not synonymous with naked power., 213
Although the district court had power to act as it did, Justice
Harlan argued that the exercise of that power might nevertheless
be improper. The restraints on that power flowed from policy
205 See id. at 384.
206 See id. at 383. "Courts of equity may, and frequently do, go much farther both to
give and withhold relief in furtherance of the public interest than they are accustomed to
go when only private interests are involved." Id. (quoting Virginian R. Co. v. System
Federation, 300 U.S. 515, 552 (1937)).
207 Id. at 385 (citing United States v. Morris & Essex R.R. Co., 135 F.2d 711, 713-
14 (2d Cir. 1943)).
208 See id.
209 Id. (quoting De Beers Consol. Mines v. United States, 325 U.S. 212 (1945)).
210 See id. (quoting Deckert v. Independence Shares Corp., 311 U.S. 282, 290
(1940)).
211 See id. (Harlan, J., dissenting).
212 See id. (Harlan, J., dissenting).
213 Id. at 387-88 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (internal quotation marks omitted).
214 See id. at 388 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (quoting Amey v. Colebrook Guaranty Say.
Bank, 92 F.2d 62, 63 (2d Cir. 1937)).
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considerations.215
Foremost among these policy considerations was one "basic to
traditional notions of equity that to justify the issuance of a
protective temporary injunction there must exist a substantial
probability that jurisdiction, judgment, and enforcement will be
obtained with respect to the person sought to be affected., 21 6 In the
instant case, Omar was not subject to the jurisdiction of the lower
court at the time the injunction was issued.2 7  To declare that the
injunction would now be a proper exercise of jurisdiction flew in
the face of principles of equity for two reasons. 2 8  First, Omar's
assets had been temporarily frozen for over two years by a court
without jurisdiction over it and without affording Omar any
opportunity to contest the injunction. 9 This action deprived Omar
of due process, "[a]nd the hand of equity should be stayed long
before it reaches constitutional limits. ' 20 Secondly, the funds now
frozen were unassailable by the United States.22' The Uruguayan
courts would not recognize a U.S. court order,222 Citibank would
be under no obligation under Uruguayan law to pay the funds over
to the United States, 223 and Citibank would be exposed to liability
215 See id. (Harlan, J., dissenting).
216 Id. at 390 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
217 See id. (Harlan, J., dissenting). The Court in its opinion had evaluated the
injunction as of the date of the hearing before it and ruled that New York law now
allowed service of process on foreign residents by mail. See id. at 381. Though the law
allowing such service was not in effect at the time suit was brought, the Court interpreted
New York law as allowing application of the new service rules to pending litigation. See
id. at 382 (citing Simonsen v. International Bank, 200 N.E.2d 427, 432 (N.Y. 1964)).
218 See id. at 392 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
219 See id. (Harlan, J., dissenting).
220 Id. at 394 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
221 See id. (Harlan, J., dissenting).
222 See id. at 402-03 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (citing Codigo de Procedimiento Civil
(Couture, 1952) (Uruguay)).
223 See id. at 394-95 (Harlan, J., dissenting). The Government had argued that it
could access the funds by serving Omar by mail in Uruguay and obtaining a default
judgment ordering transfer of the funds to New York. Upon Omar's refusal to comply,
the Government would apply for appointment under Rule 70 and make demand on the
Montevideo branch for payment. If refused, Omar, by the Government, would sue in
New York for breach of contract and the Government would then garnish the award. See
id. at 395-96 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
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in Uruguay for violations of Uruguayan law if it did So.224
Justice Harlan evaluated De Beers and determined it was
"indistinguishable from the present case and should control this
litigation., 225 The essential element in De Beers, he argued, was
the remoteness of the pre-judgment relief requested from the
ultimate disposition of the case. It was that remoteness that
compelled the Court to vacate the freeze order:
227
[A]n order [in De Beers] to stop their alleged monopolistic
practices would have been as little likely to meet with voluntary
compliance as an order to Omar to pay $19,300,000 .... Clearly
the Court's point in emphasizing the scope of the order which
could issue in the first instance was that the possibility of an
ultimate levy was too remote in practical terms to justify
freezing the property from the outset of the litigation.
Remoteness is the determinative point, whatever its cause, and
in terms of remoteness the case before us argues even stronger
than De Beers against the issuance of what amounts to an
228interim sequestration order.
Justice Harlan also reconciled Deckert as a case that had no
international implications, no personal jurisdiction issues, no
question of the court's power to enforce an order against assets, no
problem of remoteness, and assets in issue which were subject to
, 229
attachment in a state court proceeding. He concluded that the
Court with but a "slender reed" had ignored its own precedent and
"powerful equitable considerations" to approve the use of "naked
power" and "an abuse of discretion of such magnitude and
mischievous radiations in our general jurisprudence. 230
As discussed later in this Comment, the decisions of the Court
in De Beers, Deckert, and First National have been all things to all
people.23' The Court was divided on the meaning of De Beers, as
is demonstrated by the opinions in First National.232  This
224 See id. at 402-03 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
225 Id. at 397 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
226 See id. at 398 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
227 See id. (Harlan, J., dissenting).
228 Id. at 398-99 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
229 See id. at 399 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
230 Id. at 410 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
231 See infra notes 236-477 and accompanying text.
232 See First National, 379 U.S. 378.
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ambiguity in interpretation is reflected and magnified in lower
court decisions on the issue of the pre-judgment restraint of
assets.233
B. The State of the Law in the Circuit Courts of Appeal: The
Pro-Mareva Camp
The majority of the circuits have embraced, though with
variation in the strength and forthrightness thereof, the use of
equitable remedies to secure a source of assets to satisfy a
potential money judgment.234 This majority consists of the First,
Second, Third, Seventh, Eighth, Ninth, Tenth, and District of
Columbia circuits. These circuits have tended to take a narrow
view of De Beers and to rely more heavily on the majority in First
National.235  Otherwise stated, these circuits have expanded the
general equitable power of the courts across the traditional border
into the area of legal remedies.
1. The Second Circuit
The Second Circuit's decision in Alliance Bond Fund, Inc. v.
Grupo Mexicano de Desarrollo, S.A.237 marks the most profound
present embrace of the use of a Mareva-type injunction by a U.S.
Circuit Court of Appeals. 238 Decided in May 1998 but reversed by
the Supreme Court in June 1999, the Second Circuit's decision in
Alliance Bond stands as the high water mark for the Mareva
injunction on this side of the Atlantic.
The litigation arose as a consequence of the economic turmoil
in Mexico during the mid-1990s.23 9 Defendants were a holding
company and its subsidiaries engaged in the toll road construction
233 See infra notes 237-488 and accompanying text.
234 See infra notes 237-368 and accompanying text.
235 See, e.g., Alliance Bond Fund, Inc. v. Grupo Mexicano de Desarrollo, S.A., 143
F.3d 688 (2d Cir. 1998), rev'd, 119 S. Ct. 1961 (1999).
236 See id.
237 143 F.3d 688 (2d Cir. 1998), rev'd, 119 S. Ct. 1961 (1999).
238 The court commented, "We are also impressed by England's successful twenty-
year history of issuing 'Mareva injunctions' under circumstances substantially similar to
those present on appeal." Id. at 696.
239 See id. at 690.
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business.24°  Plaintiffs had made unsecured loans totaling
approximately $75 million to finance the defendants' operations.2 4'
With the economic downturn, defendants were unable to meet
their debt obligations.242 The Mexican government responded to
the crisis and advanced $309 million in Toll Road Notes to the
defendants in exchange for eventual ownership and operation of
the constructed toll roads, but the defendants had total liabilities
far in excess of the amount guaranteed by the Mexican
government.243 In addition, the defendants were favoring Mexican
creditors of equal priority as plaintiffs, which left the plaintiffs
facing the prospect of recouping only $5.5 million of their $75
million investment.244 Plaintiffs filed for a preliminary injunction
under Rule 65, and after two hearings, the trial court granted the
injunction "restraining [defendants] from dissipating, transferring,
conveying, or otherwise encumbering the [plaintiffs'] right to
receive or benefit from the issuance of the Toll Road Notes.
2 45
The defendants appealed the grant of the injunction on the
grounds that Rule 64, and not Rule 65, controlled the decision on
the motion,246 thereby presenting an issue of first impression for
the Second Circuit: Does a district court have the authority under
Rule 65 to freeze assets not directly involved in the litigation?
2 47
After reviewing Supreme Court precedents, including De Beers,
its own precedent, and that of other U.S. Circuits, the court
approved the use of Rule 65 to effect the relief ordered by the
240 See id.
241 See id. at 691.
242 See id.
243 See id.
244 See id. at 692. Defendants submitted an affidavit to the court opposing the
motion for a preliminary injunction which stated that between $214 million and $258
million of the Toll Road Notes had already been assigned to Mexican creditors,
including $137 million back to the Mexican government. After further planned
assignments, only $5.5 million would remain for plaintiffs. See id.
245 Id.
246 See id.
247 See id. at 693. The Toll Road Notes were not issued as guarantees to plaintiff
and thus were not related to the defendants default on repayment of plaintiffs' loans. All
parties agreed that the plaintiff had no recourse under Rule 64 and New York's
attachment statute. See id.
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District Court.248
The defendants argued that De Beers "bar[red] the use of
preliminary injunctions to freeze unrelated assets in any case
seeking only monetary relief," but the court found this
interpretation "too sweeping., 249  Rather, the court found that De
Beers stood for the proposition that a defendant's assets may not
be restrained when equitable relief alone is sought in the action.
In support of this interpretation, the Second Circuit looked to
Deckert and First National as endorsements of "the district court's
exercise of the general equitable power to ensure the preservation
of an adequate remedy., 251'  This represents an expansive
interpretation of the Supreme Court's decisions in both cases
which had been restricted to the district courts' statutory power




In support of its interpretation, the court approved similar
holdings in other circuits that together "settled in equity
jurisprudence that a preliminary injunction is available to protect
the plaintiffs right to recover monetary damages when there is a
threat that the defendant will become insolvent or dissipate
assets.255 The Second Circuit further declared that they thereby:
join[ed] the majority of circuits in concluding that a district
court has authority to issue a preliminary injunction where the
248 See id. at 697-98. The court's identification of the source of the district court's
power to enter the injunction is unclear. Under the heading "Power of the District Court
to Issue the Injunction," the court says immediately, "[t]his Court has approved the use
of Rule 65 to freeze assets when those assets are the subject matter in dispute." Id. at
693. Rule 65 provides procedural rules for issuance of injunctions; the power to issue an
injunction must be found elsewhere. See supra notes 157-65 and accompanying text.
The court's subsequent discussion approves the "general equitable power" of the courts
to enter preliminary injunctions, but no reference to the All Writs Act is made. 143 F.3d
at 695.
249 Id. at 693-94.
250 See id. at 694.
251 Id. at 695.
252 See supra note 190 and accompanying text.
253 See supra note 200-01 and accompanying text.
254 See Alliance Bond, 143 F.3d at 694.
255 Id. at 695 (citing Hoxworth v. Blinder, Robinson & Co., 903 F.2d 186 (3d Cir.
1990)); Teradyne, Inc. v. Mostek Corp., 797 F.2d 43 (1st Cir. 1986); In re Estate of
Marcos, 25 F.3d 1467 (9th Cir. 1994)).
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plaintiffs can establish that money damages will be an
inadequate remedy due to pending insolvency of the defendant
or that defendant has engaged in a pattern of secreting or
dissipating assets to avoid judgment.216
The court shrugged off the concern that such a position would
inaugurate exactly the assault on traditional equitable principals
warned against in De Beers by responding that "It]he defendant's
rights are adequately protected [because] traditional requirements
for obtaining equitable relief must be met before a district court
may issue an injunction. 257
Later in the opinion the court undermined any comfort this last
statement may have provided to the defendants. First, the court
proscribed any requirement that the plaintiff "establish that the
enjoined party harbored the intent to frustrate the recovery of an
eventual judgment" as "an addition to the traditional
requirements. ''25  Such a showing is merely one way to show
irreparable harm but is not the exclusive means.259 Secondly, and
in spite of its own recent precedent, 6 ° the court stated that "the
district court may properly find that the threatened injury would be
irreparable if, in the absence of an injunction, the movant would
be unable to collect such a judgment. 26' Through this
construction, the court effectively shifts the burden of persuasion
of the legitimacy of the defendant's actions from the plaintiff
seeking the injunction to the defendant contesting it.262
256 Id. at 696 (quoting In re Estate of Marcos, 25 F.3d 1467, 1480 (9th Cir. 1994)).
257 Id. at 696.
258 Id.
259 See id. at 697.
260 See Chemical Bank v. Haseotes, 13 F.3d 569, 573 (2d Cir. 1994) (per curiam).
261 Alliance Bond, 143 F.3d at 697.
262 See id. In Haseotes, the court determined that the defendants were legitimately
seeking to reduce debt and pay off creditors. See Haseotes, 13 F.3d 569. In Alliance
Bond, the district court felt the defendants were improperly establishing a priority
among creditors by assigning the Toll Road Notes. See Alliance Bond, 143 F.3d at 692.
In light of the court's statement in Alliance Bond that the movant need not show any
intent to frustrate recovery, see supra note 258 and accompanying text, the implication is
that the defendant must show the legitimacy of its actions regardless of the plaintiff's
proof.
20001 453
N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG.
2. The First Circuit
In Teradyne, Inc. v. Mostek Corporation26 the First Circuit
adjudicated an appeal from a district court's grant of a preliminary
injunction that restrained the disposition of $4 million in assets on
a $3.5 million breach of contract claim against the defendant, a
corporation in the process of liquidation.264 Following Deckert, the
court approved the use of a preliminary injunction to freeze the
status quo and protect damages remedies in cases where
defendants are likely to be insolvent.2 65 According to the court, it
was not an abuse of discretion to grant the injunction, since the
traditional requirements for an injunction had been satisfied.266
3. The Third Circuit
In Hoxworth v. Blinder, Robinson & Company, Inc.,267 the
Third Circuit likewise upheld what it termed "an extremely broad
preliminary injunction designed to protect a potential future
damages remedy. 268  In a class action for securities fraud and
RICO2 69 violations, plaintiffs sought and obtained an injunction
freezing an indeterminate amount in assets and ordering one of the
defendants to repatriate $11 million in assets transferred overseas
during the litigation, including $4 million belonging to a non-party
corporation of which he was president.27 ° Defendants, relying on
De Beers, argued that the district court was without the power to
grant an injunction designed solely to protect a future damages
263 797 F.2d 43 (1st Cir. 1986).
264 See id. at 44-45.
265 See id. at 52 (citing Deckert v. Independence Shares Corp., 311 U.S. 282
(1940)).
266 See id. at 51-52. The requirements for an injunction advanced by the court were:
(1) irreparable injury to plaintiff absent the injunction; (2) prospective harm to plaintiff
outweighs harm of injunction to defendant; (3) plaintiff has likelihood of success on the
merits; and, (4) no adverse effect on the public interest from the injunction. See id. On
the facts of the instant case, the court determined that (4), above, was not implicated.
See id. at 52.
267 903 F.2d 186 (3d Cir. 1990).
268 Id. at 189.
269 Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1962(a)
(1994).
270 See Hoxworth, 903 F.2d at 189.
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remedy.27'
The court disagreed, distinguishing De Beers and following
Deckert and First National.272 The De Beers proscription against
enjoining use of an asset, which is not the source of any potential
final judgment, was inappropriate because the plaintiff in
273Hoxworth had a claim for money damages. Since money is
fungible, it was immaterial which exact source of the defendant's
funds was restrained.274  Furthermore, distinctions between legal
and equitable claims were not important since Deckert and First
National did not rely upon any such classification."' In light of
the latter two cases, the court concluded that "De Beers is simply
inapplicable to cases in which a litigant seeks money damages." '276
What De Beers does require, in the Third Circuit's view, is that the
case at bar be more than just "any action" and include more than a
"mere statement" of secretion of assets.277 If the plaintiff can meet
these threshold requirements by showing likelihood of success on
the merits and irreparable absent the injunction, then "De Beers
does not preclude a preliminary injunction. 278
Having established the district court's power to issue the
injunction, the court then applied a traditional test to determine
whether the plaintiff had met the requirements for the injunction.279
After analyzing the plaintiffs' claims, the court determined there
was evidence from which the trial judge could have determined
they would likely succeed on the merits. On the issue of
irreparable harm, and in light of its earlier interpretation of De
Beers, the court rejected defendants' contention that the potential
271 See id. at 194.
272 See id. at 195.
273 See id. at 195-96.
274 See id.
275 See id. at 196-97.
276 Id. at 197.
277 Id. (quoting De Beers Consol. Mines v. United States. 325 U.S. 212, 222
(1945)).
278 Id.
279 See id. "These include, in this context, a showing that plaintiffs are likely to
become entitled to the encumbered funds upon final judgment and a showing that
without the preliminary injunction, plaintiffs will probably be unable to recover those
funds." Id.
280 See id. at 205.
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inability to collect a money judgment could not constitute an
irreparable injury as a matter of law.28' The facts supported a
finding of irreparable harm regarding the corporate defendant, but
the court had doubts regarding the potential harm caused by the
individual defendant.282 Beyond the fact that he had transferred
funds to the Hong Kong branch of a U.S. bank, the district court
did not state the basis of its determination that the individual
defendant was dissipating assets.283 Consequently, the court held
that transfer was an insufficient basis for finding irreparable
injury, since the mere fact the funds were now in Hong Kong did
not amount to a possibility that a final judgment would not be
satisfied.284  The court remanded to the court below the
responsibility of identifying the basis for the finding.285
Remand was necessary because the scope of the injunction
was unsupported either by any findings by the district judge
concerning the likely size of plaintiffs' recovery or by the
record. 286 Nor had the district court ascertained the value of the
assets restrained; the injunction issued "encumbers, to one degree
or another, all the assets" of the defendants as well as the non-
party corporation. 87 The preliminary injunction was also vacated
for its failure to require posting of a bond by plaintiffs in
accordance with Rule 65(c).288 The court viewed the requirement
of a posted bond as an important safeguard against rash
applications for similar types of relief.289
28I See id. (citing Deckert v. Independence Shares Corp., 311 U.S. 282, 290 (1940);
United Steelworkers v. Fort Pitt Steel Casting, 598 F.2d 1273, 1280 (3d Cir. 1979);
Teradyne, Inc. v. Mostek Corp., 797 F.2d 43 (1st Cir. 1986); Foltz v. U.S. News &
World Report, 760 F.2d 1300, 1307-09 (D.C.Cir., 1985); In re Feit & Drexler, Inc., 760
F.2d 406, 416 (2d Cir. 1985); Roland Mach. Co. v. Dresser Indus., 749 F.2d 380, 386
(7th Cir. 1984)).
282 See id. at 206-07.
183 See id. at 206.
284 See id. at 206-07.
285 See id.
2186 See id. at 198.
287 Id. at 199.
288 See id. at 209-10. "[Tjhe instances in which a bond may not be required are so
rare that the requirement is almost mandatory." Id. at 210 (quoting Frank's GMC Truck
Ctr., Inc. v. General Motors Corp., 847 F.2d 100, 103 (3d Cir. 1988)).
289 See id. at 210 (quoting Instant Air Freight Co. v. C.F. Air Freight, Inc., 882 F.2d
797, 804 (3d Cir. 1989)).
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4. The Seventh Circuit
In an opinion by Judge Posner, the Seventh Circuit in Roland
Machinery Company v. Dresser Industries, Inc.29° established a test
to analyze the criteria that would allow a plaintiff to obtain
equitable relief in support of a claim for money damages.29' The
case arose between a distributor and supplier of construction
equipment when the plaintiff-distributor entered into an agreement
with a rival supplier and the defendant-supplier exercised its right
to terminate the distributorship agreement without cause.292
Claiming a breach of the Clayton Act,293 plaintiff sued and sought
a preliminary injunction enjoining the defendant from cutting off
the supply of its equipment.294
The court concluded that, for a preliminary injunction on a
damages claim, the traditional equitable prerequisites of an
inadequate remedy at law and irreparable injury merge.2 95 No
harm is irreparable if money damages will make good the wrong;
therefore, to be irreparable, the money damages remedy must be
somehow inadequate.2 96 The court determined that a legal remedy
might be inadequate without being "wholly ineffectual."2 97
Inadequacy could occur any of four ways: (1) damages come too
late to save the plaintiff's business; (2) the plaintiff will be unable
to shoulder the costs of litigation because his business is destroyed
in the interim; (3) the ultimate award is unsatisfied because of the
defendant's insolvency; or, (4) the nature or extent of plaintiff's
damages may not be susceptible to quantification.298  After
analyzing the other requirements for an injunction,299 the court
concluded that the plaintiff had not offered proof of the likelihood
of success on the merits and reversed the court below on the grant
290 749 F.2d 380 (7th Cir. 1984), as amended on denial of rehearing and rehearing
en banc.
291 See id.
292 See id. at 381-82.
293 15 U.S.C. §§ 12-27, 29 U.S.C. §§ 52-53 (1994).
294 See Roland, 749 F.2d at 382.




299 See supra note 162 and accompanying text.
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of the injunction."'
The court's inclusion of the potential insolvency of the
defendant as supporting a preliminary injunction put the Seventh
Circuit in the pro-Mareva camp. TM Despite the dissimilarity of
Roland with cases squarely addressing asset restraint, the language
in Roland leads to the presumption that the lack of any equitable
claim is no bar to the availability of a pre-judgment restraint of
defendant's assets provided the plaintiff can satisfy the other
requirements for an injunction.
5. The Eighth Circuit
The Eight Circuit has embraced the precedent relied upon by
Alliance Bond, but the facts the circuit addressed make
characterization of its position on this subject difficult. In its
decision in Airlines Reporting Corporation v. Barry, °3 it approved
the use of a preliminary injunction that restrained the defendants
from disposing of property at issue.3°4 Plaintiff claimed defendants
had defrauded it out of the proceeds of airline ticket sales.05 The
remedy sought was both legal for compensatory and punitive
damages and equitable for the return of missing tickets." 6 The
court rather perfunctorily rejected defendants' claim that the
district court did not have the power to issue the injunction,
relying on Deckert, Teradyne, and Roland, among other cases,307
on the grounds that since plaintiff had "demonstrated a clear
300 See Roland, 749 F.2d at 396. Judge Swygert dissented on the grounds that the
majority failed to respect the discretion of the trial judge and the record did not support
reversal on a standard of abuse of discretion. See id. at 404 (Swygert, J., dissenting).
301 See Roland, 749 F.3d 380.
302 See id.
303 825 F.2d 1220 (8th Cir. 1986).
304 See id. at 1222. The injunction did not restrain any assets of the defendants other
than the disputed tickets. See id. In addition to freezing missing airline tickets, the court
enjoined defendants from instituting any other court actions, working for any




307 See id. at 1227 (citing Deckert v. Independence Shares Corp., 311 U.S. 282, 290
(1940); Teradyne, Inc. v. Mostek Corp., 797 F.2d 43, 52 (1st Cir. 1986); Roland
Machinery Co. v. Dresser Indus., 749 F.2d 380 (7th Cir. 1984); Productos Carnic, S.A. v.
Central American Beef and Seafood Trading Co., 621 F.2d 683, 686 (5th Cir. 1980)).
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probability that defendants will not be able to satisfy an award of
adequate damages . . . [plaintiff] is entitled to a preliminary
injunction to protect its remedy.""3 8 This statement approving the
use of an injunction to protect an award of damages seems to
indicate approval by the Eighth Circuit of the Second Circuit's
approach in Alliance Bond.
6. The Ninth Circuit
As late as 1982, the Ninth Circuit had opposed the use of Rule
65 for any claim not equitable in nature.309 In the 1990s, however,
a pair of decisions put the Ninth Circuit squarely in the pro-
310Mareva camp.
The first occurred in Reebok International, Ltd. v. Marnatech
Enterprises, Inc. t In that case, Reebok sued Marnatech and
others under the Lanham Act3 12 for selling counterfeit Reebok
shoes in Mexican border towns."' Reebok first obtained a
temporary restraining order and then a preliminary injunction
enjoining future copyright violations and freezing defendants'
assets.314  After refuting defendants' argument that the district
court lacked jurisdiction over them under the Lanham Act, the
court addressed the district court's power to freeze assets under the
same Act.
315
The court was unclear whether the Lanham Act authorized the
restraint of assets ordered by the district court.3"6 The Act did
allow for a recovery of defendant's profits and damages, and a
308 Id.
309 See Federal Trade Comm'n v. H.N. Singer, Inc., 688 F.2d 1107, 1112 (9th Cir.
1982).
310 See In re Estate of Ferdinand Marcos, Human Rights Litigation, 25 F.3d 1467
(9th Cir. 1994); Reebok International, Ltd. v. Marnatech Enterprises, Inc., 970 F.2d 552
(9th Cir. 1992).
311 970 F.2d 552 (9th Cir. 1992).
312 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051-1127(1994).
313 See Reebok, 970 F.2d at 554.
314 See id.
315 See id. at 554-58. The district court had determined that attachment under Rule
64 was unavailable to Reebok from the language of California's attachment statute. See
Reebok Int'l Ltd. v. Marnatech Enterprises, Inc., 737 F.Supp. 1521, 1526 (S.D.Cal.
1989) (quoting CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 483.010 (West 1979)).
316 See Reebok, 970 F.2d at 558-59.
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pre-judgment restraint might be necessary to preserve those
remedies.317 The court did not find it necessary to decide the scope
of the authority in the Lanham Act, however, because they viewed
the district court's injunction as "authorized by [its] inherent
equitable power to issue provisional remedies ancillary to its
authority to provide final equitable relief.""3 ' The injunction was
necessary to preserve the district court's ability to order an
accounting of the defendants' profits and subsequent return of
those profits illegally obtained, which are remedies expressly
authorized by the Act.319 Therefore, the injunction was ancillary to
the district court's authority to provide final relief3 20
That classification of the injunction as ancillary undermined
defendants' argument that De Beers prohibited the injunction.3 21
As the court pointed out, De Beers reversed the lower court on the
grant of the injunction because it was not ancillary to any final
relief.322 Furthermore, in line with the instruction in De Beers that
"a preliminary injunction is always appropriate to grant
intermediate relief of the same character as that which may be
granted finally, 323 the court found the injunction granted below to
have been "an equitable provisional remedy designed to secure the
availability of Reebok's equitable right to an accounting of
[defendants'] profits. 324 The majority noted in a footnote that the
district court's injunction restrained all of defendants' assets and
not merely those that might represent fraudulent profits.2 5  The
317 See id. at 559 (quoting 15 U.S.C. §§ 1116-17).
38 Id. The court noted that Rule 64 is not the exclusive authority for asset restraint.
Furthermore, attachment is not necessarily the same as restraining transfer of assets. See
id. at n.10.
319 See id. at 559-60.
320 See id. at 560.
321 See id.
322 See id.
323 Id. at 561 (quoting De Beers Consol. Mines v. United States, 325 U.S. 212, 220
(1945)).
324 Id.
325 See id. at 560 n. 11. The majority stated that freezing assets that would not be the
subject of final relief "may not be within the equitable power of the district court." Id.
(citing De Beers Consol. Mines v. United States, 325 U.S. 212, 220 (1945)) (emphasis
added). The majority did not feel compelled to decide anything further on this issue
since the scope of the freeze had not been raised on appeal. See id.
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concurrence approved the result, but included a caveat:
This is a prejudgment freeze of everything the appellants own -
it is sweeping, general, and very broad. It is the kind of order
that could drive an opponent to the wall regardless of the
ultimate merits of the action. It is a frightening example of the
reach of the court's injunctive power, and that in a case where
an attachment would not lie and an insubstantial bond was
S 326
required.
The concurrence went on to emphasize that because the
defendants had not appealed the scope of the injunction but merely
the power of the district court to enter it, the court's decision
should be limited to that question; whether the district court had
the power under the Lanham Act to issue the injunction. 327
While Reebok expanded the use of preliminary injunctions to
restrain assets, the court had been careful to emphasize the
equitable nature of the claim and the final relief sought."' It would
take another case before the Ninth Circuit would unequivocally
embrace the use of injunctions to secure a source of funds for a
strictly legal claim of money damages. That case is In re Estate of
Ferdinand Marcos, Human Rights Litigation,"' a class action
lawsuit brought by families of alleged victims of torture, summary
execution, or disappearance.33° Only money damages were sought
by the plaintiffs.33'
Interpreting the triumvirate of De Beers, Deckert, and First
National, the court decided that a preliminary injunction was
appropriate in a case where money damages would be inadequate
because of the defendant's pending insolvency or pattern of
dissipation of assets.332 It viewed the expansive language in De
326 Id. at 563 (Fernandez, J., concurring).
327 See id. at 564 (Fernandez, J., concurring).
328 See Reebok, 970 F.2d 552.
329 25 F.3d 1467 (9th Cir. 1994). The case was a consolidation of numerous cases
filed after the Marcoses fled from the Philippines to Hawaii in 1986. See id. at 1469. An
asset freeze had been in place on the Marcoses' assets as the result of a suit brought by
the Philippine Government claiming the return of money taken from the country, but that
injunction was dissolved upon settlement. See id. (citing Republic of Philippines v.
Marcos, 862 F.2d 1355 (9th Cir. 1988)).
330 See id. at 1468.
I" See id. at 1476.
332 See id. at 1480.
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Beers as limited its citation to Deckert and its subsequent
interpretation in First National.333 The court noted that in so doing
it thereby joined the majority of circuits.334 Furthermore, the facts
of the instant case supported the injunction: plaintiffs had
prevailed on the merits while the appeal from the interlocutory
order was pending; defendants had been twice found by federal
courts to be in the act of secreting assets; and defendants would
not be harmed by the restraint since the estate of Ferdinand
Marcos could not be distributed until all claims had been
resolved.335 The court likewise cited the district court's reliance as
justification for the injunction that many of the defendant's assets
were on deposit in banks in Switzerland and Hong Kong.336
Neither court discussed any implications of the extraterritorial
reach of the injunction. 37 It is open to conjecture whether the
injunction would have been upheld in a case with a less egregious
fact pattern. With the weight of persuasive authority on the side of
the court's holding, perhaps the particular facts were simply
redundant to the ultimate decision.
7. The Tenth Circuit
The Tenth Circuit's most recent decision on the issue of pre-
judgment restraint in Tri-State Generation and Transmission
Association, Inc. v. Shoshone River Power, Inc.338 is somewhat
unusual because the court was faced with an appeal denying a
preliminary injunction.339 The procedural posture of the appeal is
"I See id. at 1477-78 (citations omitted).
334 See id. at 1478-80 (citing United States ex rel. Taxpayers Against Fraud v.
Singer Co., 889 F.2d 1327 (4th Cir. 1989); Airlines Reporting Corp. v. Barry, 825 F.2d
1220 (8th Cir. 1987); Teradyne, Inc. v. Mostek Corp., 797 F.2d 43 (1st Cir. 1986); Tri-
State Generation and Transmission Ass'n, Inc. v. Shoshone River Power, Inc., 805 F.2d
351 (10th Cir. 1986); Foltz v. U.S. News & World Report, 760 F.2d 1300 (D.C.Cir.
1985); Green v. Drexler, 760 F.2d 406 (2d Cir. 1985); Roland Mach. Co. v. Dresser
Indus., 749 F.2d 380 (7th Cir. 1984)).
... See In re Estate of Marcos, 25 F.3d at 1478-79. The posture of the appeal in In
re Estate of Marcos was analogous to that of Alliance Bond before the Supreme Court.
See Grupo Mexicano de Desarrollo, S.A., v. Alliance Bond Fund, Inc., 119 S. Ct. 1961,
1965 (1999).
336 See In re Estate of Marcos, 25 F.3d at 1479.
337 See id.
338 805 F.2d 351 (10th Cir. 1986).
"9 See id.
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significant because it required the party seeking the injunction to
overcome the abuse of discretion standard that appellate courts
apply when reviewing interlocutory orders.34 Nevertheless, the
abuse of discretion standard did not suffice to avoid the
injunction.34'
Defendant was a distributive electric utility in Wyoming. 42 It
had a requirements contract to buy power from plaintiff, a
conglomerate of generation and transmission cooperatives.
3 43
When cheaper power became available from another supplier,
defendant sought to sell its assets to the low-cost supplier and
distribute the proceeds to its members. 44  Plaintiff sought a
preliminary injunction, which was initially granted, enjoining the
sale on the grounds the sale would breach the requirements
contract. 45 After further evidence was presented, the district court
dissolved the injunction, reasoning that damages would be
adequate to compensate plaintiff for any breach.346
On the issue of irreparable injury, the circuit court determined
that two bases existed for finding irreparable injury.3 47 First, under
Wyoming law, it was unclear whether plaintiff could recover
damages against the low-cost supplier after the sale due to an
indemnification agreement between the low-cost supplier and the
defendant.3 48 The court concluded that "[d]ifficulty in collecting a
damage judgment may support a claim of irreparable injury. If
[plaintiff] cannot collect a money judgment, then failure to enter
the preliminary injunction would irreparably harm it. 3 49 Second,
the court was concerned that the other cooperatives within the
plaintiff's group would likewise capitalize on the chance to
liquidate their assets and acquire cheaper electricity.5
340 See id.
141 See id.
342 See id. at 353.
141 See id.
341 See id. at 353-54.
341 See id. at 354.
346 See id.
347 See id. at 355-56.
348 See id. at 355.
141 Id. (citations omitted).
350 See id. at 356. The U.S. Government filed an amicus brief warning of the
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The court relied most heavily upon this equitable basis."' In
the court's view, the prospect of the plaintiff's inability to survive
the litigation and the threat to other similarly situated cooperatives
predominated over the damages issue.352 Thus, the court's holding
did not rely upon the independent authority of the district court to
employ a preliminary injunction restraining assets to secure a
future damages award.353 Therefore, this case falls short of a
strong embrace of the propriety of Mareva-type relief. The court's
language approving an injunction to protect a damages remedy is
mere dicta.
8. The District of Columbia Circuit
The final case to be discussed in support of the Alliance Bond
approach is Foltz v. U.S. News & World Report.35 4 Foltz involved
a class action suit under the Employee Retirement Income
Security Act355 in which former employees sought an injunction
preventing distributions from a pension plan they claimed would
disproportionately benefit current employees to the detriment of
the class.356  The proposed distribution was instigated by the
lucrative sale of the company to a real estate developer.3 The
district court denied the relief on the basis that the requested
injunction went beyond a restraint of assets about to be removed
from the jurisdiction or dissipated.358
The circuit court remained within the paradigm of
distinguishing between legal and equitable remedies.59  By
shifting the emphasis of the injunction away from securing a pool
of assets for satisfaction of an eventual judgment to preserving the
demise of the Rural Electrification Administration system if such self-interested behavior
were allowed. See id.
351 See id. at 356-58.
352 See id.
313 See id.
354 760 F.2d 1300 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
355 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461 (1994).
356 See Foltz, 760 F.2d at 1301-02.
357 See idat 1301.
358 See id. at 1305 (citing USACO Coal Co. v. Carbomin Energy, Inc., 689 F.2d 94
(6th Cir. 1982); Lynch Corp. v. Omaha Nat'l Bank, 666 F.2d 1208 (8th Cir. 1981))
(other citations omitted).
359 See id. at 1309.
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status quo pending the outcome of the litigation, the court
indulged in a sleight of hand to recast the issue as an essentially
equitable one."6  In this fashion, the injunction would be "an
equitable remedy designed to freeze the status quo, as opposed to
creating a pool of resources from which members of the plaintiff
class could draw prior to a determination of liability [or]
damages. 36' The genuineness of this distinction is belied by
further discussion in the opinion, as the court later instructed the
lower court that a factor in a possible injunction is the amount of
damages plaintiffs would likely recover and implied that any
excess amount in the pension plan could be distributed.
3 62
The court did not reverse the lower court but did remand the
issue with instructions for further consideration in light of its
decision.363 The opinion seems to be a tightrope act, trying to
afford relief, which the court feels is unavailable but justified.
This decision predates all the other cases discussed in this
Comment with the exception of Roland and USACO; 64 perhaps
that accounts to some extent for the reticence of the District of
Columbia Circuit to embrace the Mareva-type remedy.
9. Summary of the Pro-Mareva Camp
The pro-Mareva camp has embraced the general equitable
power of the courts as a means of ensuring the enforceability of a
future damages remedy.3 65 The approach taken by these Circuits
has come to resemble that of the English Mareva injunction.366 In
this approach, the equitable power of the court is employed not as
a substitute for an inadequate legal remedy, but as an adjunct to
360 See id.
361 Id.
362 See id. "The affording of such remedial relief would not run afoul of the well-
settled principle of equity that monetary relief is not to be awarded in a money damages
case prior to a deternination of both liability and the extent of damages." Id. (citation
omitted).
363 See id.
364 See supra notes 290-302 and accompanying text; infra notes 442-57 and
accompanying text.
365 See supra notes 234-364 and accompanying text.
366 See, e.g., Alliance Bond Fund, Inc. v. Grupo Mexicano de Desarrollo, S.A., 143
F.3d 688 (2d Cir. 1998).
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ensure the adequacy of a future legal remedy.367 This shift in focus
is an expansive view of the traditional principles of equity."'
C. State of the Law: The Anti-Mareva Camp
In minority opposition to the circuits analyzed in the preceding
section, a handful of circuits have held the line against the
intrusion of equitable interlocutory relief to secure future legal
remedies.369 As with the majority, depth of commitment to holding
the line varies among the circuits composing the minority, with the
Eleventh and Fifth circuits most firmly committed, followed by
the Fourth and Sixth circuits.170 This section concludes with a
Fourth Circuit case that suggests one method of resolving this area
of law.37'
1. The Eleventh Circuit
Much as the Second Circuit leads the van for the pro-Mareva
jurisdictions, the Eleventh Circuit occupies the same role for the
opposition. In two cases decided in 1994, the Eleventh Circuit
staked out the parameters of the argument against the adoption of
the "nuclear weapon of law" '372 embraced by many of its sister
circuits.
The first case of the pair was Mitsubishi International
Corporation v. Cardinal Textile Sales, Inc. 373 The plaintiff,
Mitsubishi, had been the victim of an elaborate fraud perpetrated
by two of its employees with the assistance of several outside
374companies. The employees sent purchase orders for carpet yarn
and other textiles to a supplier for eventual resale to two textile
brokerage companies.375 Through a system of fictitious bills of
367 See id. In Alliance Bond, for example, the injunction was used to prevent
dissipation that threatens the future legal remedy, not as a replacement for that future
legal remedy. See id.
368 See I IA WRIGHT ETAL., supra note 141, § 2947.
369 See infra notes 372-488 and accompanying text.
370 See id.
371 See infra notes 471-88 and accompanying text.
372 NICHOLAS ROSE, PRE-EMPTIVE REMEDIES IN EUROPE 1 (1992).
13 14 F.3d 1507 (11th Cir. 1994).
374 See id. at 1511.
371 See id.
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lading and purchase orders, Mitsubishi paid for yarn that was
never delivered while extending credit to the brokers for yarn
never bought.376 By the time the circular transactions were
discovered, Mitsubishi had provided in financing or paid millions
of dollars for fraudulent yarn sales.377
Mitsubishi sought legal and equitable relief including damages
for fraud and conversion and the imposition of a constructive trust,
an accounting, and the appointment of a receiver. 7 ' The district
court granted a temporary restraining order [hereinafter TRO]3 79
that was enlarged in scope several times until it ultimately
imposed a constructive trust on defendants through a freeze of a
significant portion of their assets, an equitable accounting of funds
received from Mitsubishi, appointment of a receiver, and
expedited discovery.380 When the district court modified the TRO
to allow defendants to pay legal fees out of the restrained assets
and precluded Mitsubishi from seeking future disgorgement of the
fees, Mitsubishi appealed.38" '
The court pierced the allegations in the complaint and
concluded that the equitable relief sought and granted by the
district court in the TRO was properly viewed as an action to
collect a debt.382 Equitable relief was simply not appropriate in the
case because an adequate legal remedy was available, namely,
376 See id. at 1511-12.
377 See id.
378 See id. at 1512.
379 The TRO was extended by consent of the parties to allow time to prepare for the
preliminary injunction hearing. See id. at 1513.
380 See id. at 1513.
381 See id. at 1514. The court recognized that a TRO is not appealable under 28
U.S.C. § 1292. See id. at 1515. The principle that the appellate court should construe
the effect rather than the label of the interlocutory order led the court to conclude that the
TRO issued by the district court "had the effect of a preliminary injunction because it did
not merely preserve the status quo but instead granted affirmative relief." Id. at 1515
n.14. In that light, the district court's refusal of Mitsubishi's request to deny
modification of the orders, after a full hearing, was properly viewed as a denial of a
request for a preliminary injunction and therefore immediately appealable. See id. at
1516-17.
382 See id. at 1519-20. "[T]he remedy Mitsubishi should have sought is the recovery
of money for breach of a promise to pay or for an account stated (and not the imposition
of a constructive trust)." Id.
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damages,"' and Georgia law precluded the remedy of a
constructive trust for a failure to keep a promise in a commercial
contractual relationship.384
With the availability of a legal remedy for the payment of
liquidated damages for breach of promises to pay and unliquidated
damages for injury from fraud, the court took a dim view of the
nature of the TRO:3 85
The temporary restraining order ... was akin to a prejudgment
writ of attachment, presented in the form of an injunction
against the defendants .... When faced with motions appearing
to call for an attachment but labeled something else, federal
courts again look past the terminology to the actual nature of the
relief requested . . . . As is the case when we evaluate our
jurisdiction, we will call a duck a duck when characterizing
district court rulings in this context.386
Since the order was one for an attachment rather than a
preliminary injunction, Rule 64 rather than Rule 65 applied.387 In
order to be entitled to an attachment, Mitsubishi must have
satisfied the requirements of Rule 64.388 Though not addressed at
the trial court nor argued on appeal, the court determined that the
Georgia attachment statute did not authorize such an action on the
facts of the case.3 89
Citing De Beers and In re Fredeman Litigation,"° the court
fired a broadside shot at the circuits that had approved the use of
preliminary injunctions to effect an attachment, stating its belief
that "such decisions are premised upon erroneous readings of De
Beers and federal procedural rules, as well as upon incorrect
applications of basic equity jurisprudence."'3 9' In conclusion, the
court echoed the admonition in De Beers of the "sweeping effect"
383 See id. at 1518-19.
384 See id. at 1519 (citing Bank of Dade v. Reeves, 354 S.E.2d 131 (Ga. 1987)).
385 See id. at 1520.
386 Id. at 1520-21 (citations omitted).
387 See id. at 1521-22.
388 See id. at 1521.
389 See id. at 1522.
390 843 F.2d 821 (5th Cir. 1988).
391 Id. at 1522 n.24 (ciing Hoxworth v. Blinder, Robinson & Co., 903 F.2d 186 (3d
Cir. 1990)).
[Vol. 25468
PRE-JUDGMENT RESTRAINT OF ASSETS
of such use of preliminary injunctions."'
The majority's opinion elicited a spirited dissent.393 In the
dissent's view, the majority had misconstrued Georgia law."394
While a constructive trust is not available if an adequate remedy at
law exists, in the instant case the legal remedy was inadequate
because of the threat of dissipation and the higher priority a
constructive trust holder enjoys compared to a judgment
creditor.9 In short, "the majority is wrong" on the availability of
a constructive trust.
396
From that determination, the dissent reached the obvious
conclusion.397 Mitsubishi's claim was properly equitable for a
constructive trust and an accounting.9 ' Therefore, "what the
majority insists on calling an unauthorized writ of attachment is in
fact a permissible preliminary injunction. "'99  The grant of a
preliminary injunction to freeze assets and preserve the status quo
was well-established in the Eleventh Circuit.400  The dissent
decried the majority's decision as "a license [to defendants] to
plunder and dissipate what is left of the equitable estate ... when
the law provides a means to prevent it."4''
Two months later, the court had the opportunity to address the
question again and arrived at the same result.402 The facts of Rosen
v. Cascade International43  are somewhat analogous to
392 Id. at 1522-23 (quoting De Beers Consol. Mines v. United States, 325 U.S. 212,
222-23 (1945)).
313 The dissent concurred in part that the court did have jurisdiction to hear the
appeal. See id. at 1523 (Carnes, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
394 See id. at 1523-25 (Carnes, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
311 See id. (Carnes, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
396 Id. at 1525 (Carnes, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
397 See id. (Carnes, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
398 See id. (Carnes, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
399 Id. (Carnes, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
400 See id. at 1525-26 (Carnes, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (citations
omitted).
401 Id. at 1526 (Carnes, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
402 The similarity of reasoning is not surprising since Chief Judge Tjoflat wrote the
opinion in both cases. See id. at 1510; Rosen v. Cascade Int'l, Inc., 21 F.3d 1520 (1 1th
Cir. 1994). The other members of the panel were Carnes and Johnson in Mitsubishi, 14
F.3d at 1510, and Dubina and Roney in Rosen, 21 F.3d at 1522.
403 21 F.3d 1520(llth Cir. 1994).
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Mitsubishi.40 4  The plaintiff's claim arose through fraudulent
misrepresentations, although in Rosen these misrepresentations
occurred in the context of securities transactions. °5  Cascade, a
manufacturer of cosmetic and skin care products, had filed false
statements with the Securities Exchange Commission and had
issued seven million shares of stock without accounting for the
issue in annual reports. °6 After discovery of the discrepancy,
trading in the company's stock was suspended, the company
declared bankruptcy, and numerous lawsuits were filed by
shareholders. 407 The suits were ultimately consolidated into a class
action in the Southern District of Florida. 8
Upon application by the plaintiff class, the district court
granted a TRO freezing all of the assets of one of the defendants.4 9
After a hearing, the TRO was extended as a preliminary
injunction.4 0 The district court construed De Beers as authorizing
an injunction to protect a future damages remedy.'
The circuit court disagreed.4 12 After pointing out that the only
remedy sought was for money damages, the court launched into a
review of the jurisprudential dichotomy between legal and
equitable relief.413 Drawing heavily on its recent analysis of the
issue in Mitsubishi and reemphasizing its reading of De Beers, the
court concluded unequivocally, "We repeat: preliminary injunctive
relief freezing a defendant's assets in order to establish a fund with
which to satisfy a potential judgment for money damages is simply
not an appropriate exercise of a federal district court's
authority. '" 4 4In arriving at this conclusion, Chief Judge Tjoflat
presented a compelling counter to the reliance of other circuits on
404 See id.
405 See id. at 1522.
406 See id. at 1522-23.
407 See id. at 1523-24.
408 See id. at 1524.
409 See id. at 1522, 1525. This defendant was Lawrence Moses, a Pennsylvania
dentist who was an outside member of Cascade's board of directors. See id.
410 See id. at 1525. Plaintiff class deposited a $100,000 bond. See id.
411 See id. at 1525-26.
412 See id. at 1526.
4 11 See id. at 1527.
414 Id. at 1530.
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First National as a limitation of the broad language in De Beers.415
The claim in First National was in the nature of a foreclosure, not
a suit for money damages; the injunction freezing the bank
accounts of the tax debtor went to the very assets that had
previously been made subject to the tax lien giving rise to thefo " 411
foreclosure.
Continuing the analysis used in Mitsubishi, the court identified
the relief granted below as equivalent to a writ of attachment and
applied Rule 64 and Florida's attachment statute to determine that
attachment was not authorized.417  Additionally, Florida law did
not allow use of an injunction when the attachment statute failed
to provide relief.418 The court vacated the injunction and remanded
the case to the district court.4 19 There was no dissent.42°
2. The Fifth Circuit
The Fifth Circuit reemphasized the historical bounds of equity
in a plaintiff's attempts to restrain assets in the case of In re
Fredeman Litigation,4 2' decided in 1988, the same year the English
Court of Appeal decided Duvalier and Derby No. 1.422
Fredeman involved a civil RICO suit against corporations and
their former officers and directors accused of systematic
overcharging of customers for vessel refueling and anti-trust
violations. 423 After a previous injunction on defendants' assets was
lifted upon conclusion of a companion criminal case,424 plaintiffs
sought and obtained a preliminary injunction that restrained
411 See id. at 1529-30 n.19; see, e.g., Hoxworth v. Blinder, Robinson & Co., 903
F.2d 186 (3d Cir. 1990).
416 See Rosen, 21 F.3d at 1530 (citing United States v. First Nat'l City Bank, 379
U.S. 378, 385 (1965)).
417 See id. at 1530-31.
418 See id. at 1531 (citations omitted).
419 See id. at 1531.
420 See id.
421 843 F.2d 821 (5th Cir. 1988).
422 For a discussion of the English cases, see supra notes 41-74 and accompanying
text.
423 See Fredeman, 843 F.2d at 822.
424 The defendants involved in the appeal in the instant case all had been either
acquitted in a companion criminal case of RICO charges or had had the criminal RICO
charges against them dismissed. See id. at 822-23.
20001
N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG.
enumerated assets. 425 The district court did not base its power to
grant the injunction upon the RICO statute,4 6 but on its "inherent
power to protect--through equity--the future utility of a potential
judgment for damages., 427  The defendants appealed solely on the
issue of whether the district court had such an equitable power and
not on any factual justification for a preliminary injunction.42 ' The
court reviewed the district court's decision subject to the standard
of independent review.429
The court restated the traditional rule of equity that a court
could not freeze a defendant's assets to preserve a fund to satisfy a
potential money judgment.40 Relying on De Beers and two of its
own decisions,43' the court rejected plaintiffs' right to an injunction
in which their only claim was for treble damages.432 In this light,
the preliminary injunction granted below was an attachment
governed by Rule 64 and Texas law.433 Since the defendants were
available for personal service in Texas and the plaintiffs' claims
were unliquidated, the plaintiffs had no recourse through the Texas
attachment statute. 4
The court rejected as irrelevant the plaintiffs' claims that
defendants would attempt to frustrate any ultimate judgment or
plaintiffs' likelihood of success at trial.435 The court felt that the
question of remoteness advanced in De Beers was concerned with
the proximity of the assets sought to be enjoined with the
underlying claim and the number of contingencies between the
425 See id. at 823. Assets restrained included effectively all of the assets of the
defendants other than tangible personal property and $3,000 in cash. See id.
426 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-68 (1994).




431 See id. at 825. (citing Federal Savings & Loan Ins. Corp. v. Dixon, 835 F.2d 554
(5th Cir. 1987), and TT Comm. Dev. Corp. v. Barton, 569 F.2d 1351 (5th Cir. 1978)).
432 See id. at 824-25.
431 See id. at 826.
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two."' The requirement against remoteness must be satisfied as a
threshold question even if the traditional requirements for an
injunction are met.437 The court reconciled decisions of other
circuits with its own appraisal of De Beers.438  The court also
distinguished cases where the defendant was about to become
insolvent and the orders preserved specific assets or were ancillary
to some other equitable relief.439 The court further analyzed any
basis for the injunction under the RICO statute and Texas statutory
provisions, but concluded that neither basis applied.44 ° With no
authority for the district court's exercise of power, the court
vacated the injunction.44'
3. The Sixth Circuit
The Sixth Circuit's decision in USACO Coal Company v.
Carbomin Energy, Inc.442 offered solace to both sides of the
struggle.443 On one hand, it subscribes to a reading of De Beers
consistent with the anti-Mareva camp and the basis of its holding
respects the traditional principles of equity espoused by the Fifth
and Eleventh Circuits.444  On the other hand, the opinion
anticipates the pro-Mareva trend of later cases among other
circuits .4 4 5
At issue in the case was a broad injunction restraining a
436 See id.
411 See id.
438 See id. at 827 (citing Tri-State Generation v. Shoshone River Power, Inc., 805
F.2d 351 (10th Cir. 1986); Foltz v. U.S. News & World Report, 760 F.2d 1300 (D.C. Cir.
1985); USACO Coal Co. v. Carbomin Energy, Inc., 689 F.2d 94 (6th Cir. 1982)). The
court classified Foltz and Tri-State Generation as cases in which courts "have upheld
preliminary injunctions to preserve the particular assets in dispute in actions that were
essentially in rem." Id.
419 See id. at 828 (citing Deckert v. Independence Shares Corp., 311 U.S. 282
(1940); Teradyne, Inc. v. Mostek Corp., 797 F.2d 43 (1st Cir. 1986)). Such an instance
would arise with the appointment of a receiver. See id.
440 See id. at 828-31 (citations omitted).
441 See id. at 831.
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corporate defendant's disposition of assets.446  The underlying
claims were for violations of RICO, breach of fiduciary duty,
common law fraud, and breach of contract, an equitable and legal
mix. 4 4' Defendants claimed the injunction was improper as an
impermissible sequestration of assets under Rule 64.448 The court
disagreed, holding that the basis for the injunction was the
"substantial likelihood that plaintiffs would ultimately prevail on a
claim for restitution based on the allegation of a breach of
fiduciary duty., 449 That equitable claim permitted the imposition
of a constructive trust on any benefit derived from the breach of
the fiduciary duty.45 0 As such, the district court's decision did not
run afoul of De Beers because "[t]he injunction ...preserves
assets for which the defendants may be accountable under a
constructive trust. 45  The court took pains to clarify that "[t]he
injunction was not issued in order to secure a RICO treble
damages award.,
452
Having established that the district court had the power to
issue the injunction, the court went on to ascertain whether the
traditional requirements for an injunction were met in this case.453
In discussing the issue of irreparable harm, the court used
language supporting the pro-Mareva circuits. 4  The court found
that Kentucky's attachment and lis pendens statutes would be
inadequate to provide protection from the dissipation or
concealment of assets which was considered likely by the district
court.455  This finding implies that the probable dissipation or
concealment of assets constitutes an adequate basis for irreparable
harm; if a state's attachment statute offers inadequate protection
446 See id. at 96.
441 See id. at 95-96.
448 See id. at 96.
449 Id.
450 See id. at 97.
451 Id.
452 Id.
453 See id. at 98.
454 See id. at 99.
455 See id. The court continued, "[b]ecause neither statute answers the court's
concern that defendants may successfully conceal their assets and remove them from this
country, we cannot say that the failure to require the plaintiffs to pursue legal remedies
was an abuse of discretion." Id.
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therefrom, possible dissipation or concealment renders the legal
remedy inadequate. Though the court arrived at this point after
answering the threshold question of whether the district court had
the power to issue the injunction, as dictated by Fredeman,456 the
language itself supports an inference more favorable to the pro-
Mareva camp. In toto, however, the Sixth Circuit's adherence to
the traditional equitable remedy of restitution as the basis for the
injunction, and not any desire to preserve a future damages
remedy, appears to be advocating a view hostile to that espoused
by the pro-Mareva circuits.457
4. The Fourth Circuit
The Fourth Circuit's example is particularly enlightening.
Within the past ten years, the court has interpreted De Beers twice,
in 1989 in United States ex rel Taxpayers Against Fraud v. Singer
Company,458 and in August 1998 in United States v. Cohen .4 9 The
position of the court changed significantly from the first to the
second decision.
In Taxpayers Against Fraud, the court heard an appeal by the
principal defendant, Singer, from an injunction, designed to
prevent any liquidation or distribution of assets that required
judicial review of all transactions other than those in the normal
course of business.46° Singer had recently been the subject of a
leveraged buyout but faced a separate complaint seeking $77
million under the False Claims Act.46 ' The plaintiff alleged that
that Singer, along with other defendants, had defrauded the
government in a series of defense contracts through a price-
padding scheme.462 When Singer began to divest assets as a result
of the buyout by two brokerage houses, plaintiff sought the
456 See discussion at supra notes 423-41 and accompanying text.
451 See USACO, 689 F.2d at 96.
458 889 F.2d 1327 (4th Cir. 1989).
459 152 F.3d 321 (4th Cir. 1998).
460 See Taxpayers Against Fraud, 889 F.2d at 1328. Defendant also appealed from
an order denying permission for specific distributions. See id.
461 31 U.S.C. § 3729 (1994). This amount could be trebled in the final judgement.
See id.; Taxpayers Against Fraud, 889 F.2d at 1328.
462 See id. at 1329.
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injunction."'
The district court considered the triumvirate of De Beers,
Deckert, and First National in ruling on the motion for a
preliminary injunction.464  It determined that De Beers was
distinguishable while the latter two cases controlled.465 The Fourth
Circuit never addressed the applicability of De Beers or First
National, but did analyze Deckert.466  The court considered
Singer's argument that only bankruptcy or attachment proceedings
should be available to the plaintiff.467 The court found that the
threats of insolvency and danger of depletion of assets were
adequately supported in the record.46 The court concluded that the
plaintiff had satisfied the traditional requirements for an
injunction.469
With this backdrop indicating a predilection for the restricted
interpretation of De Beers, the court's recent holding in Cohen is
surprising. As in Taxpayers Against Fraud, the Government
sought monetary penalties for violations of federal law.47° The
Government sued Cohen and four business associates under the
Financial Institution Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act of
1989,471 alleging twenty-five violations of federal banking law.472
The district court entered a TRO freezing Cohen's assets from the
date the complaint was filed, which matured into a preliminary
463 See id.
464 See id. at 1330.
465 See id.
466 See id.
467 See id. The court noted that "[p]reliminary injunctions are permitted in situations
such as the one presented here where the plaintiff alleged that the principal defendant
was 'insolvent and threatened with many law suits, that its business [was] virtually at a
standstill because of unfavorable publicity, that preferences to creditors [were] probable,
and that its assets [were] in danger of dissipation and depletion."' Id. (quoting Deckert
v. Independence Shares Corp., 311 U.S. 282, 285 (1940)) (citing Teradyne, Inc. v.
Mostek Corp., 797 F.2d 43 (1st Cir. 1986); Roland Mach. Co. v. Dresser Indus., 749
F.2d 380 (7th Cir. 1984); Mutual Benefit Life Ins. Co. v. Atlas Financial Corp., 454 F.2d
278 (3d Cir. 1972)).
468 See id. at 1330-31.
469 See id. at 1331-36 (citations omitted).
470 See United States v. Cohen, 152 F.3d 321 (4th Cir. 1998).
471 See 12 U.S.C. § 1833a.
472 See id. at 323.
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injunction after a hearing. 473  The injunction exempted living
expenses, legal fees, and ordinary business expenses from its
scope.474 The district court identified five sources for its authority
to grant the injunction without specifically relying on any single
one: its inherent equitable power; principles of supplemental
jurisdiction; Rule 65; the All Writs Act; and federal banking law.475
The court addressed each possible source in turn, beginning
with the inherent equitable power of the district court, which
implicated De Beers.476 In two paragraphs, the court noted the
cautionary language of De Beers and the split in authority among
its sister circuits. 7 It then concluded "that the case at hand is not
significantly different from De Beers. Accordingly, the district
court erred in relying upon its inherent equitable powers to enter a
pre-judgment injunction freezing Cohen's assets., 478  The court
made no factual findings to support its analogy and indulged in no
analysis. 9 Perhaps the court did not wish to join the fray, instead
preferring a position unassailable by either side by virtue of its
ambiguousness.
With similar brevity, the court evaluated the other possible
sources of the district court's authority to enter the injunction.4 s°
Supplemental jurisdiction gives a district court the power to
address state law claims that share a common nucleus of fact, but
does not confer any additional injunctive power.4 ' Rule 65 is even
less availing as it merely "regulates the issuance of injunctions
otherwise authorized.4 82 The court recognized that the All Writs
Act authorizes the issuance of injunctions beyond those necessary
for jurisdiction, but it "is not relevant to an order freezing assets
411 See id.
414 See id. at 323 and n.2.
475 See Cohen, 152 F.3d at 324. The federal banking law referred to by the district
court is 18 U.S.C. § 1345(a)(2)(B) (1994). See id.
476 See id.
4"I See id. The court noted that the Fifth, Sixth, and Eleventh Circuits followed De
Beers, while "the First, Third, and Ninth Circuits found distinctions between it and the
case with which they were confronted." Id.
478 Id.
419 See id.
480 See id. at 324-25.
481 See id.
482 Id. at 325.
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unless such order is in aid of an injunction which had been
otherwise issued. Consequently, the All Writs Act is inapplicable
as a source of authority in the present case." '483 Nevertheless, the
plaintiff prevailed on its final claim. The court held that federal
banking law "explicitly empowered district courts to enter
injunctions to freeze the assets of a person guilty of banking law
violations." '484
The district court did not consider Rule 64 as a source of
authority. In fact, "'Rule 64 speaks to provisional remedies
prior to judgment' which is the precise relief sought in the present
case." 48 6 Furthermore, Virginia's attachment statute went farther
than federal banking law in allowing attachment if a defendant is
"'converting, is about to convert, or has converted his property of
whatever kind, or some part thereof, into money, securities or
evidences of debt with intent to hinder, delay, or defraud his
creditors.' 87 Having established two bases for the district court's
authority, the court nevertheless remanded for factual findings to
support the injunction, as none had been provided.4 88
Cohen's position on the All Writs Act and attachment has
much in common with those of the Fifth and Eleventh Circuits, but
its ambivalence on De Beers prevents Cohen from assuming the
role of foil to Alliance Bond. Nevertheless, the Fourth Circuit's
extensive treatment of the applicable state attachment statute
points to an appropriate resolution of the tension between a
plaintiff's anxiety from a potentially worthless judgment and a
defendant's right to use, enjoy, and alienate his property until the
rights of the parties have been otherwise adjudicated.
483 Id.
484 Id. "If a person is alienating or disposing of property, or intends to alienate or
dispose of property, obtained as a result of a banking law violation... or property which
is traceable to such violation, the Attorney General may commence a civil action in any
Federal court to enjoin such alienation or disposition of property." 18 U.S.C. §
1345(a)(2)(A) (1994).
485 See id.
486 Id. (quoting I IA WRIGHT ETAL., supra note 141, § 2931).
487 Id. (quoting VA. CODE 8.01-534(A)(4)(5)(6), 534(B)).
488 See id. at 326. "[T]he factual basis for the injunction or attachment order,
whatever the same may be called, must be set forth with particularity in accordance with
Rule 65." Id. Whether the court meant that an attachment order under Rule 64 required
compliance with Rule 65 seems doubtful.
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Part IV: Recent Developments and Conclusion
The question of pre-judgment restraint implicates
longstanding principles of Anglo-American law and equity
jurisprudence. As Part I demonstrated, England has embarked,
first by judicial interpretation, then by statutory codification of
previous judicial decisions, along the path of granting greater
authority and discretion to courts to accord pre-judgment
restraint.489 Part III proposed that the majority of American circuit
courts of appeal have either embraced the same approach or
indicated approval for its underpinnings. Only a few circuits
seem to be resisting the allure of wider use of interlocutory
restraints.49'
Two preliminary questions must be answered before
determining whether Mareva is suitable for transportation across
the Atlantic. The first looks to the transferability in general of
English methods of practice; the second explores the proper role of
the judiciary in creation of novel remedies. While Anglo-
American jurisprudence shares a common foundation, it does not
necessarily follow that legal theories or methods of practice should
be identical. This has been clear since the 1760's, when
Americans determined that writs of assistance, a measure of long-
standing validity in England, were inappropriate in America.492
The Fourth Amendment prohibits such writs in the United
States.49 ' Furthermore, American standards of due process are
much different than their English counterparts. 
494
Additionally, the United States has preserved the remedy of
attachment under Rule 64 for which no English counterpart
489 See supra notes 9-136 and accompanying text.
490 See supra notes 166-489 and accompanying text.
491 See supra notes 370-489 and accompanying text.
492 See M. H. SMITH, THE WRITS OF ASSISTANCE CASE (1978).
493 See Brower v. County of Inyo, 489 U.S. 593, 596 (1989) (stating "[tihe writs of
assistance ... were the principal grievance against which the Fourth Amendment was
directed."). The Anton Piller order has much in common with the writ of assistance. See
supra note 43 and accompanying text. The symbiotic relationship between Marevas and
Anton Piller orders should raise doubts about the propriety of both in American
jurisprudence.
194 An American minimum contacts analysis would have precluded personal
jurisdiction over the Swiss and Lichtensteiner defendants in Derby No. 6. See supra
notes 106-28 and accompanying text.
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exists. 95  While a plaintiff in an English court arguably has no
alternative to a Mareva injunction, an American plaintiff has
greater legal options. This distinction goes to the heart of the
second question. Attachment statutes are available to preserve a
source of funds in anticipation of a future money judgment. In
each state, the legislators have spoken to the terms and conditions
upon which an attachment may issue.496 Some states have created
the availability of attachment in a suit in equity. 497 The Rhode
Island statute demonstrates that legislatures have the ability and
opportunity to define the parameters of pre-judgment
attachment.498 If they so choose, legislatures can expand the
availability of such attachments.
A theme running through the cases approving Mareva-type
injunctions is the potential irreparable harm to the plaintiff
415 See Derby Nos. 3 and 4, 1990 Ch. 65, 88 (1988).
496 See ALA. CODE § 6-6-41 (1993); ALASKA STAT. § 09.40.010 (Lexis 1998); ARIZ.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-1521 (1994); ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-110-101 (Michie 1987); CAL.
CIv. PROC. CODE § 483.010 (West 1979); COLO. R. Civ. PRO. 102 (1998); CONN. GEN.
STAT. ANN. § 52-279 (West 1991); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 3501 (1974); D.C. CODE
ANN. § 16-501 (1997); FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 76.01-.03 (West 1987); GA. CODE ANN. §
18-3-1 (1999); HAW. REV. STAT. § 651-1 (1993); IDAHO CODE § 8-501 (1998); 735 ILL.
COMP. STAT. ANN. § 5/4-101 (West 1992); IND. CODE ANN. § 34-25-2-1 (Michie 1998);
IOWA CODE ANN. § 639.3 (West 1995); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-701 (1994); Ky. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 425.301 (Michie 1992); LA. CODE CIV. PROC. ANN. art. 3501 (West 1961);
ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 4151 (West 1964); MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. §
3-302 (1995); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 223, § 42 (Law. Co-op.1986); MICH. STAT. ANN. §
27A.4001 (Law. Co-op. 1988); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 570.02 (West 1988); Miss. CODE
ANN. §§ 27-18-101, 27-18-203 (1999); Mo. REV. STAT. S7. § 521.010 (1986); MONT.
CODE ANN. § 27-18-203 (1997); NEB. REV. STAT. § 25-1001 (1995); NEV. REV. STAT.
ANN. §§ 31.013, 017 (Michie 1979); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 498:16, 511:1 (1997);
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:26-2 (West 1987); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 42-9-1 (Michie 1978); N.Y.
C.P.L.R. § 6201 (McKinney 1980); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-440.3 (1996); N.D. CENT.
CODE §§ 32-08.1-.03 (1996); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2715.01 (Anderson 1992); OKLA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 1151 (West 1988); OR. R. CIv. PRO. 84 (1997); 42 PA. CONS.
STAT. ANN. § 7501 (West 1998); R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 10-5-2, -5, -6 (1997); S.C. CODE
ANN. § 15-19-10 (Law. Co-op. 1976); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS §§ 21-17A-2-5 (Michie
1987); TENN. CODE ANN. § 29-6-101 (1980); TEx. Civ. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. §§
61.001, 002 (West 1997); UTAH R. Civ. PRO. 64C (1999); VT. R. Civ. PRO. 4.1 (1988);
VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-534 (Michie 1992); WASH. REv. CODE ANN. §§ 6.25.030, 040
(West 1995); W. VA. CODE § 38-7-2 (1997); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 811.03 (West 1994);
WYO. STAT. ANN. § 1-15-201 (Michie 1997).
491 See, e.g., R.I. GEN. LAWS § 10-5-5 (1997).
498 See id. Of course, any such statute must abide by constitutional considerations.
See supra note 33.
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threatened by the dissipation of assets by the defendant. However,
that argument disregards fraudulent conveyance law and other
remedies available to a judgment creditor. While a pre-judgment
restraint may be more convenient for the plaintiff, convenience is
but a "slender reed" for the exercise of such "naked power." 99
The distinction between a legal and equitable claim is dispositive
of the availability of pre-judgment restraint. A majority of the
Supreme Court seized upon this threshold question when it
reviewed the Second Circuit's decision in Alliance Bond. °'
A. The Supreme Court's Reversal in Alliance Bond
The divisive nature of the argument over the availability of
pre-judgment restraint, apparent by the split in the Circuit Courts
of Appeal, is manifested in the Supreme Court's June 1999
reversal by a 5 to 4 margin of the Second Circuit's decision in
Alliance Bond. °2  Justice Scalia, writing for the majority,"'
rejected the expansion of interlocutory relief past the limits of
traditional equity jurisprudence.5" The Court determined that the
authority of the federal district courts to issue preliminary
injunctions was limited to that conferred by the Judiciary Act of
1789.505 The authority thereby conferred consisted of "the
principles of the system of judicial remedies which had been
devised and was being administered by the English Court of
499 United States v. First National City Bank, 379 U.S. 378, 410 (1965) (Harlan, J.,
dissenting).
500 See, e.g., Mitsubishi Int'l Corp. v. Cardinal Textile Sales, Inc., 14 F.3d 1507
( lth Cir. 1994).
51 See Grupo Mexicano de Desarrollo, S.A. v. Alliance Bond Fund, Inc., 119 S.Ct.
1961, 1971 (1999).
502 See Grupo Mexicano de Desarrollo, S.A. v. Alliance Bond Fund, Inc., 119 S.Ct.
1961 (1999). The Court unanimously agreed that it had jurisdiction to hear the appeal
from the grant of a preliminary injunction; the appeal had not become moot upon merger
of the preliminary injunction into a permanent injunction upon a judgment on the merits
since the enjoined party's claim against the injunction bond for a wrongful injunction
survived the judgment on the merits. See id. at 1965-68.
503 Justice Scalia was joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices O'Connor,
Kennedy, and Thomas. See id. at 1964.
504 See id. at 1969. "We do not question the proposition that equity is flexible; but
in the federal system, at least, that flexibility is confined within the broad boundaries of
traditional equitable relief." Id.
505 See id. at 1968 (citing Judiciary Act of 1789, 1 Stat. 78).
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Chancery at the time of the separation of the two countries."5 °6
Under that system, "a judgment establishing the debt was
necessary before a court of equity would interfere with the
debtor's use of his property." ' 7 Without a judgment, a creditor
had no substantive rights to the property of the debtor. °8 The
merger of law and equity did not change requirement for a
judgment."9
The Court found Deckert and First National to be "entirely
consistent with the view that the preliminary injunction in this case
was beyond the equitable authority of the District Court."5 0
Deckert involved a claim for equitable relief.11 First National was
distinguishable from the case at bar in that it "involved not the
Court's general equitable powers under the Judiciary Act of 1789,
but its powers under the [tax lien statute]," implicated a public
rather than a private interest, and "the creditor (the Government)
asserted an equitable lien on the property.""5 2 Furthermore, De
Beers "strongly suggest[s]" the limits of a pro-Mareva reading of
Deckert and First National.
513
The Court expressed concern that allowing the use of Mareva-
type relief "could render Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 64,
which authorizes use of state prejudgment remedies, a virtual
irrelevance. Why go through the trouble of complying with local
attachment statutes when this all-purpose prejudgment injunction
506 Id. (quoting Atlas Life Ins. Co. v. W.I. Southern, Inc., 306 U.S. 563, 568
(1939)).
507 Id. at 1969.
508 See id. at 1968.
The [general] rule [regarding creditor's bills] requiring a judgment
was a product, not just of the procedural requirement that remedies at
law had to be exhausted before equitable remedies could be pursued,
but also of the substantive rule that a general creditor (one without a
judgment) had no cognizable interest, either at law or in equity, in
the property of his debtor, and therefore could not interfere with the
debtor's use of that property.
Id.
509 See id. at 1970.
510 Id. at 1971.
511 See id.
5I2 d. at 1971-72.
513 Id. at 1972.
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is available?"5 '14 Such relief "could radically alter the balance
between debtor's and creditor's rights which has been developed
over centuries through many laws-including those relating to
bankruptcy, fraudulent conveyances, and preferences."5 '5 In the
Court's view, it is for Congress to redefine the balance between
the substantive rights of debtors and creditors."6
Justice Ginsburg's dissent517 decried the Court's reliance "on
an unjustifiably static conception of equity jurisdiction." '518 In her
view, while the type of injunction ordered by the District Court
was not one of "the specific practices and remedies of the pre-
Revolutionary Chancellor," the order was nevertheless consistent
with the principles governing injunctive relief.519 Federal equity
jurisprudence must be "adaptable" and "dynamic."52  Without
such dynamism, courts will be unable "to meet the requirements of
every case, and to satisfy the needs of a progressive social
condition in which new primary rights and duties are constantly
arising and new kinds of wrongs are constantly committed."52 '
Traditional limits notwithstanding, modern conditions, such as
"increasingly sophisticated foreign-haven judgment proofing
strategies, coupled with technology that permits the nearly
instantaneous transfer of assets abroad," demand injunctive relief
to preserve an appropriate remedy.522 In this regard, Justice
Ginsburg approved of the development of the Mareva in English
courts.
5 2 3
Abuse of such a tool by overreaching creditors would be
avoided by the traditional requirements for injunctive relief,
especially the showing of irreparable injury.524 The required bond
514 Id. at 1974.
515 Id.
516 See id. at 1975.
517 Justice Ginsburg was joined by Justices Stevens, Souter, and Breyer. See id.
518 Id. at 1976 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting)
519 Id. (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
520 Id. at 1976, 1977 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
521 Id. at 1976 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (quoting Union Pac. Ry. Co. v. Chicago,
R.I. & P. Ry. Co., 163 U.S. 564 (1896)).
522 Id. at 1977 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
523 See id. at 1978 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
524 See id. (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
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and tailoring of the scope of the injunction would "ensure a
remedy for a wrongfully enjoined defendants" and "spar[e] the
defendant from undue hardship. 5 25 For Justice Ginsburg, Alliance
Bond represents the "paradigmatic" example of the proper
employment "of a preliminary freeze order designed to stop the
dissipation of assets that would render a court's judgment
worthless. 526 She concluded, "absent congressional direction... I
would find the default rule in the grand aims of equity . . . the
federal courts must rely on their 'flexible jurisdiction in equity...
to protect all rights and do justice to all concerned.' 5 27
B. Conclusion
As mandated by the Supreme Court, American courts must
return to the "traditional principles of equity jurisdiction. '5 28 De
Beers, Deckert, and First National, now clarified by Alliance
Bond, dictate that an equitable remedy requires an equitable cause
of action. If equitable relief is sought, injunctions may issue; if
legal damages are sought, attachment is the only possibility. In
their discretion, courts have room to be imaginative within that
paradigm; disregarding that paradigm is a mischievous and grand
abuse of discretion. 29  The expansive use of equitable relief to
secure future damages remedies through judicial imperialism is an
infringement of a defendant's substantive rights and an affront to
American principles of equity and fair-play. Whether the ultimate
outcome in Alliance Bond will conclusively repel the Mareva
invasion is open to debate. The hydraulic pressure of those
claiming a source of funds against those seeking to retain that
source will doubtless seek release elsewhere, either through
Congress or a new "nuclear weapon of law. 53 °
JAMES R. THEUER
525 Id. (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
526 Id. at 1978-79 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
527 Id. at 1979 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (quoting Providence Rubber Co. v.
Goodyear, 76 U.S. (9 Wall.) 805 (1870)).
528 See id. at 1969; 1 IA WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 141, § 2941.
529 See First National, 379 U.S. at 410 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
530 See ROSE, supra note 372.
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